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Hyde, Julie Christine. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2011. Material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance for federal grants to U.S. counties. Major 
Professor: Carolyn M. Callahan. 
 
Audits of internal control over compliance in accordance with the Office of 
Management and Budget Circular A-133 indicate the presence of material weaknesses. 
These weaknesses highlight breakdowns in internal control and create the opportunity for 
financial mismanagement and fraud. This study evaluates material weaknesses in internal 
control over compliance for U.S. counties. Material weaknesses are mapped into internal 
control elements, and the study examines both entity determinants and auditor 
characteristics associated with the reporting of material weaknesses. This three-paper 
dissertation contributes to the existing literature by shedding new light on material 
weaknesses reported during audits of federal grants. 
The first paper classifies material weaknesses in internal control over compliance 
into the five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization‘s (COSO) 
internal control framework and by the 14 compliance requirements listed in Circular A-
133. The second study investigates determinants of material weaknesses using the 
following county characteristics: size, financial health, complexity, and the presence of a 
material weakness in the financial statements. The third paper examines associations with 
the following auditor characteristics: PCAOB firm registration, voluntary membership 
with the AICPA‘s Governmental Audit Quality Center, the disclosure of a material 
weakness on the related financial statements, and initial-year auditors.  
 Results indicate that the majority of material weaknesses are classified as control 
activities. Empirical results indicate that financially weak, complex counties as well as 
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counties with material weaknesses in financial statements are more likely to report 
material weaknesses in compliance. In addition, auditors who report material weaknesses 
in county financial statements are likely to report material weaknesses in internal control 
over compliance and are more likely to be first-year auditors. 
 The results of this study can benefit county managers, grantor agencies, and 
auditors as they review and evaluate the ability of current internal control systems to 
prevent and detect material errors or fraud. The results could also influence counties‘ 







This dissertation study was designed as three separate and distinct studies which 
consider factors influencing material weaknesses in internal control over compliance for 
federal grants. Prior research is sparse on single audits and specifically, material 
weaknesses reported during single audits. Consequently, this study expands knowledge 
for federal grant audits and provides new information related to weak internal control 
framework components as well as county and auditor characteristics associated with the 
reporting of material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. As of the time of 
the completion of this dissertation, none of these three studies has been submitted to 
journals for publication. 
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Each year U.S. counties receive billions of dollars in federal grants that fund 
programs such as education, community development, community health, and public 
safety. As part of annual single audit requirements to evaluate internal control under 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133, auditors report internal 
control weaknesses over compliance. A material weakness is ―a significant deficiency,
1
 
or combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood 
that material noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program 
will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal control‖ (AICPA 2008a, 247). 
Material weaknesses in internal control over compliance may raise issues with program 
eligibility determinations and allowable grant costs. Insufficient controls also may result 
in fraud and abuse.  
Despite the high federal expenditures, little is known about the factors related to 
material weaknesses since revised federal guidelines took effect in 1997. Evidence about 
possible determinants of county material weaknesses could influence future research on 
what can be done to prevent them, a valuable tool for county management, grantor 
agencies, and auditors. This dissertation, which consists of three papers, categorizes 
material weaknesses into five internal control components and examines both entity and 
auditor characteristics associated with counties that report internal control weaknesses for 
single audits.  
                                                          
1
 A significant deficiency in internal control over compliance is ―a control deficiency, or combination of 
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the entity‘s ability to administer a federal program such that 
there is more than a remote likelihood that noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a 
federal program that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal 




The first paper evaluates material weaknesses under OMB Circular A-133 
reported by auditors to determine if patterns exist in the frequencies of various internal 
control weaknesses reported. This information benefits managers who develop, maintain, 
and monitor internal control by identifying areas that may need additional focus. The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) internal control framework is used to 
classify 356 material weaknesses reported for single audits of 159 U.S. counties in fiscal 
year 2007. COSO framework components consist of the control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. The 
control environment sets the tone of an organization and serves as the foundation for the 
remaining elements. Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks 
that threaten the achievement of management‘s objectives. Next, control activities are the 
policies and procedures that help ensure management directives are implemented. 
Information and communication refers to the identification, capture, and communication 
of timely pertinent information. Finally, monitoring is the process to assess the quality of 
internal control performance over time (COSO 1992). 
After mapping each material weakness into one or more component categories, 
results indicate that a majority of material weaknesses fall under the control activities 
category. This evidence indicates that actual control activities performed are essential to 
the administration of federal grants and may suggest that auditors focus more audit effort 
in this area. The results of Paper 1 are used to determine if county characteristics are 
associated with the five different categories of material weaknesses in Paper 2. 
Given that material internal control weaknesses can be categorized into COSO 
framework categories, a second area of importance would be to determine if certain 
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county characteristics are associated with a specific category of material weakness. While 
prior research finds that private companies with material weaknesses tend to be smaller, 
financially weaker, and more complex (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan 
and Lilien 2005), this is the first study to examine the association between a 
governmental entity and reported material weaknesses. The second paper examines 
county characteristics such as size, financial strength, and complexity as well as the 
presence of a financial statement material weakness to determine their association with 
reported material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. The sample includes 
the counties with material weaknesses in fiscal year 2007, used in Paper 1, along with a 
matched control sample. Empirical results show that complex, financially weak entities 
and those with material weaknesses in financial reporting are more likely to have material 
weaknesses under single audits. Unlike private companies, size is not a factor in internal 
control weaknesses for governmental entities. Evidence may aid the monitoring role of 
grantor agencies and auditors by highlighting risk factors for counties with weak internal 
controls.  
The third paper investigates characteristics of auditors that disclose material 
weaknesses for 4,560 U.S. counties in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Prior research 
focuses on quality differences between private and government auditors and 
distinguishing features between large and small CPA firms (Brown and Raghunandan 
1995; Jakubowski 1995; Lopez and Peters 2010). In contrast, this study explores specific 
auditor characteristics and uses a new control variable to account for client risk 
portfolios. Empirical results indicate that disclosures of material weaknesses in internal 
control are related to reported material weaknesses on the financial statements and most 
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likely are reported by first-year auditors. This study makes incremental contribution to 
the body of literature related to auditor changes and reported internal control weaknesses 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007) and adds a governmental setting. 
Together, these studies contribute to the current literature by filling a gap related 
to audits of federal grants, and more specifically, to the area of internal control over 
compliance. Geographically-dispersed counties across the U.S. are the population of 
interest for each paper, whereas prior studies use internal control weaknesses in a single 
state (Boyle et al. 2004) or combine counties with municipalities (Lopez and Peters 
2010). This is the first study to analyze descriptions of weaknesses solely for single 
audits and for those identified weaknesses in the time period after compliance revisions 
effective in 1997 (Boyle et al. 2004). Also, no prior research uses a governmental entity‘s 
financial and demographic data to study determinants of material weaknesses. Absent 
from prior research, the inclusion of a variable to control for client risk helps control for 
the riskiness of audit clients and may influence future research studying auditor 
characteristics related to internal control weaknesses over compliance. The results of this 






Descriptions of Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls over Compliance for 




This study examines 356 material weaknesses in internal control over compliance 
in accordance with OMB Circular A-133 in relation to the five components of the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organization‘s (COSO) Internal Control-Integrated 
Framework (COSO 1992). The sample consists of 159 general purpose counties reporting 
at least one material weakness in fiscal year 2007. The weaknesses are classified by 
COSO component and by the 14 compliance requirements listed in Circular A-133. The 
majority of material weaknesses are classified as control activities with risk assessment as 
the lowest proportion of weaknesses. County size, as measured by total federal 
expenditures, is marginally significant to both the risk assessment and control activity 
components. The results of this study can benefit county managers as they review and 
evaluate the ability of their current internal control systems to prevent and detect material 





The objective of this study is to map material weaknesses in internal control over 
compliance for federal grants as defined by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-133 into the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
1
 (COSO) 
internal control framework. Since its introduction in 1992, the COSO model has become 
the most widely used framework for internal controls (Shaw 2006). As presented in 
Figure 2.1, COSO describes five key components of internal control: control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring. While auditors use the COSO framework in performing audits of federal 
grants, they report their findings in categories of the 14 compliance requirements of OMB 
Circular A-133 as listed in Table 2.1. This study examines the control components using 
actual internal control weaknesses reported for federal grants and categorizes the 
weaknesses into the five COSO elements. Such mapping is important because users of 
single audit reports are not privy to audit workpapers, which document internal control 
components. Study results could help grant administrators, grantor agencies, and auditors 
determine where breakdowns in internal control over federal grants occur so that they can 
develop effective policies specific to federal programs.  
 
                                                          
1
 The sponsoring organizations include the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Executives International, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and 






Figure 2.1 – COSO Internal Control Components 
Source:  COSO (1992) 
 
 
A material weakness is ―a significant deficiency,
2
 or combination of significant 
deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that material noncompliance 
with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program will not be prevented or 
detected by the entity‘s internal control‖ (AICPA 2008a, 247).
3
 The sample examined in 
this study consists of 159 U.S. counties that disclosed in fiscal year 2007 at least one 
material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular 
A-133, which outlines audit provisions for federal grants. The 356 disclosed material 
                                                          
2
 A significant deficiency in internal control over compliance is ―a control deficiency, or combination of 
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the entity‘s ability to administer a federal program such that 
there is more than a remote likelihood that noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a 
federal program that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal 
control‖ (AICPA 2008a, 247). 
 
3
 Subsequent to the study‘s sample period, the definition of material weakness was revised. Issued in 
December 2009, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 117, ―Compliance Audits,‖ changed the definition 
from ―more than a remote likelihood to ―a reasonable possibility‖ (AICPA 2009b). This change does not 
impact the results of this study. 
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weaknesses are classified by the 14 compliance requirements as outlined in OMB 
Circular A-133 and mapped into the five COSO components and to determine if patterns 
exist in the frequencies of various internal control weaknesses reported. Doyle et al. 
(2007) argue that the types of internal control weaknesses are relevant in identifying their 
determinants.  
The study finds that a majority of reported weaknesses are classified as control 
activities. This means that the policies and procedures used to achieve management 
objectives are not operating effectively. COSO (1992) states that the five internal control 
components are interrelated. Due to this interrelated nature of the internal control 
framework, material weaknesses could be classified into one or more COSO control 
components. The 356 material weaknesses are categorized into 521 control components. 
County size, as measured by total federal expenditures, is related to the control activities 
component. That is, as total federal grant expenditures increase, the likelihood of control 
activity weaknesses increases. A negative relation exists between size and the risk 
assessment component. 
Study results can assist grant administrators, grantor agencies, and auditors in 
identifying relationships between types of weaknesses so appropriate strategies to 
improve and monitor weak areas can be developed. A recent Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report on public housing indicates this process has not been followed and 
states, 
HUD does not systematically summarize audit findings to identify and 
understand emerging and persistent issues to better monitor housing 
agencies for inappropriate use and mismanagement of public housing 
funds. Understanding these problems could be useful for identifying 
housing agencies that are at greater risk of inappropriately using or 




The identification of vulnerable areas is important. GAO testimony before a 
congressional subcommittee points to internal control weaknesses that led to 
vulnerabilities in Department of Education federal grant administration (GAO 2001a). 
Consequently, these weaknesses may result in improper payments that often require grant 
repayments by grantees. With the U.S. budget for fiscal year 2011 proposed to award 
over $645 billion in federal grants to state and local governments, understanding internal 
control weaknesses is imperative (OMB 2010). Norman et al. (2004) posit that weak or a 
lack of internal controls often lay the groundwork for individual fraudulent behavior. 
Therefore, grant administrators, grantor agencies, and auditors will be interested in the 
descriptive results of this research. Results could highlight weak control areas for 
counties or raise questions as to whether auditors focus their audit testing in certain 
internal control areas. 
Counties administer federal grants for a broad spectrum of programs including 
school systems, public safety, highway and road projects, and community development 
programs. Counties provide a suitable setting as their varied program activities lead to 
different types of federal grants audited and cover a wide spectrum of federal grantor 
agencies. In studying internal controls in North Carolina, Coe and Ellis (1991) find 
improper acts are more likely in county than city governments. In addition, audit findings 
are important as they may highlight current issues in grant administration and point 
grantor agencies to greater areas of concern.  
Government settings have been used to study internal control weaknesses. Boyle 
et al. (2004) evaluate internal control weaknesses reported for state agencies in Rhode 
Island and classify them into the five COSO categories to evaluate frequencies. Their 
10 
 
study is limited to a single state and includes both financial and compliance findings. 
This study, however, uses a sample of counties across the United States which provides a 
more diverse sample and includes only material weaknesses reported in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 audits. While prior research on internal control weaknesses under 
Circular A-133 audits focuses on auditor types and frequencies, no research directly 
assesses the reported weaknesses (Jakubowski 1995; Lopez and Peters 2010). This study 
is the first to examine the five interrelated internal control elements with regard to 
internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular A-133. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
background of federal grant audits and the COSO internal control framework. The third 
section includes prior research with the next section describing the methodology. The 
fifth section reports the empirical results and includes a discussion of results. The final 
section includes the summary and concluding comments. 
2.2 Background 
Audits of Federal Grants 
Auditors of financial statements consider the entity‘s internal control over 
financial reporting as required by generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). 
Auditors of governmental entities also assess internal control with regard to Government 
Auditing Standards (GAGAS or ―Yellow Book‖). Auditors who perform single audits for 
governmental entities also perform procedures to obtain an understanding of internal 





 Compliance requirements are outlined in 14 categories as shown in Table 2.1. 
Auditors assess control risk and perform tests of controls over major programs, as 
described below. In addition, OMB Circular A-133 requires auditors ―to plan the audit to 
support a low assessed level of control risk for major programs‖ (OMB 2003, Subpart E 
§___.500 (c)). 
                                                          
4
 Major programs are determined by a risk-based approach and usually include the grants with the largest 
annual expenditures. Auditors document and perform tests of internal controls and compliance for major 
programs, and have no responsibility under Circular A-133 for nonmajor programs. 
12 
 
Table 2.1 - 14 Compliance Requirements of OMB Circular A-133 
Compliance Requirement Control Objectives 
Activities allowed or 
unallowed 
Federal awards are expended only for allowable activities 
Allowable costs/cost 
principles 
Costs of goods and services charged to federal awards are 
allowable and in accordance with applicable cost circulars 
Cash management The drawdown of federal cash is only for immediate needs 
of grantee or subrecipient. 
Davis-Bacon Act Contractors and subcontractors are properly notified of 
Davis-Bacon Act requirements and the required certified 
payrolls are submitted to grantee. 
Eligibility Only eligible individuals and organizations receive 
assistance under federal award programs. 
Equipment and real property 
management 
Proper records are maintained for equipment acquired with 
federal awards, equipment is adequately safeguarded and 
maintained, disposition of equipment or real property is in 
accordance with federal requirements, and grantor agency 
is compensated for its share of property sold or converted 
to nonfederal use. 
Matching, level of effort, 
earmarking 
Matching, level of effort, or earmarking requirements are 
met using only allowable funds or costs which are properly 
calculated and valued. 
Period of availability of 
Federal funds 
Federal funds are used only during the authorized period of 
availability. 
Procurement and suspension 
and debarment 
Procurement of goods and services are made in compliance 
with provisions of A-102 Common Rule or OMB Circular 
A-110, as applicable, and that covered transactions are not 
made with a debarred or suspended party. 
Program income Program income is correctly earned, recorded, and used in 
accordance with the program requirements. 
Real property acquisition and 
relocation assistance 
Compliance with the real property acquisition, appraisal, 
negotiation, and relocation requirements are met. 
Reporting Reports of federal awards submitted to the grantor agency 
include all activity of the reporting period, are supported 
by underlying accounting or performance records, and are 
fairly presented in accordance with program requirements. 
Subrecipient monitoring Federal award information and compliance requirements 
are identified to subrecipients, subrecipient activities are 
monitored, subrecipient audit findings are resolved, and the 
impact of any subrecipient noncompliance is evaluated. 
Also, ensure that subrecipient obtained required audits and 
takes appropriate corrective action on audit findings. 
Special tests and provisions Ensure compliance with each material special federal 




Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133 discusses internal 
control over compliance in a manner similar to the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) definition of internal control. Both define internal control as:  
a process, effected by an entity‘s board of directors, management, and other 
personnel designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the following categories: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations; (2) reliability of financial reporting; and (3) compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations (OMB 2003; COSO 1992). 
 
Internal control pertaining to the compliance requirements for major programs narrows 
the objectives to federal grant programs. 
In performing compliance audits under OMB Circular A-133, auditors must 
assess and test internal control for each compliance requirement applicable to a federal 
grant. The analysis is performed for each of the five internal control elements. For 
example, a county health department may administer the Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC) grant where participant eligibility is an essential compliance requirement. 
Auditors would document and test their understanding of each COSO internal control 
component under eligibility and report any audit findings that, based on their materiality, 
can be elevated to material weaknesses. 
OMB Circular A-133 requires auditors to prepare a report on internal control over 
compliance for major programs. Auditors report significant deficiencies in ―the design 
and operation of internal control that could adversely affect the entity‘s ability to 
administer a federal award program in accordance with laws and regulations‖ (Wilson et 




Internal Control Framework 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) was formed in 1985 to 
sponsor the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway 
Commission) to study the causal factors that are associated with fraudulent financial 
reporting and to make recommendations to reduce the incidence of fraudulent reporting. 
COSO subsequently released Internal Control—Integrated Framework in 1992 with 
principles-based guidance for designing and implementing effective internal controls 
(COSO 1992). According to a CFO Magazine poll released in 2006, 82 percent of 
respondents said they used the COSO framework for internal controls making it the most 
widely used internal control framework in the U.S. (Shaw 2006). 
The COSO internal control framework consists of five components as depicted in 
Figure 2.1 (COSO 1992). The control environment sets the tone of an organization and 
serves as the foundation for the remaining elements. Control environment factors include 
integrity and ethical values, commitment to competence, the attention and direction 
provided by the board of directors or audit committee, management‘s philosophy and 
operating style, organizational structure, assignment of authority and responsibility, and 
human resource policies and practices. 
Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks that 
threaten the achievement of management‘s objectives. Economic, industry, 
regulatory, and operating risks are addressed. Examples include changes in the 




Control activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure 
management directives are implemented. They ensure necessary steps are taken to 
address risks and occur throughout the organization. Control activities include 
approvals, authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, reviews, security of 
assets, and segregation of duties. 
Information and communication refers to the identification, capture, and 
communication of timely pertinent information in a form and time frame so 
people can carry out their responsibilities. A primary element is the organization‘s 
accounting information system. Information systems produce reports with 
operational, financial, and compliance information that make it possible to run 
and control the organization. In addition, effective communication must flow 
throughout the organization. Finally, monitoring is the process to assess the 
quality of internal control performance over time. This includes ongoing 
monitoring activities such as regular supervisory activities, and separate 
evaluations such as periodic audits. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires management of 
publicly-held companies to identify an internal control framework in their evaluation of 
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. The SEC (2003) defines a 
―suitable, recognized control framework‖ as one ―that is established by a body or group 
that has followed due-process procedures, including broad distribution of the framework 
for public comment.‖ Though the COSO framework is not required to be used, the SEC 
acknowledges it as being suitable for management‘s evaluation (SEC 2003). The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) requires external auditors of publicly-
16 
 
held companies to use the same control framework to perform their audit of 
management‘s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting 
(PCAOB 2007a). The internal control system is considered ineffective if one or more 
material weaknesses
5
 exist (PCAOB 2007b).  
Government organizations also recognize the importance of internal 
control. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues standards for 
internal control in the federal government, commonly known as the ―Green 
Book,‖ as required by the Federal Managers‘ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 
(GAO 2001b). Issued in 1999, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government is based on the COSO internal control framework and parallels the 
private sector‘s adoption of COSO provisions (GAO 1999). In fact, Government 
Auditing Standards (2007) refers to internal control guidance in Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework, published by COSO, in its guidance to auditors 
who are required to obtain an understanding of internal control. The COSO 
internal control framework is recommended by the GAO for all levels of 
government. 
This study integrates the COSO requirements with those in Circular A-133. The 
five internal control components are used to classify material weaknesses under Circular 
A-133 by using the audit finding detail. Based on a review of prior research, this type of 
classification has not been performed, and this is the first study to incorporate the COSO 
framework with federal grant audit findings. 
                                                          
5
 PCAOB defines a material weakness as ―a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control 
over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the 





2.3 Prior Research 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requirement for auditors to report on 
internal control over financial reporting has raised the awareness of internal control 
systems. In addition, the public availability of financial information, including material 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, has spawned research on internal 
controls (Hoitash et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005).  
In the private sector, research on material weaknesses in internal control largely 
focuses on weaknesses associated with factors such as audit fees (Hogan and Wilkins 
2008; Raghunandan and Rama 2006), corporate governance (Hoitash et al. 2009; Zhang 
et al. 2007), or entity characteristics (Doyle et al. 2007). Ge and McVay (2005) classify 
types of material weaknesses in SEC filings and find that material weaknesses in internal 
control are related to deficient revenue-recognition policies, lack of segregation of duties, 
deficiencies in period-end reporting process and accounting policies, and inappropriate 
account recognition, but they do not use the COSO framework as a basis for 
classification. 
Boyle et al. (2004) use a governmental setting to examine types and frequencies 
of internal control weaknesses and evaluate the interrelated nature of COSO components. 
Using a sample of 32 Rhode Island state reports with internal control weaknesses in fiscal 
year 1996, Boyle et al. categorize the weaknesses into the COSO elements. Results 
indicate that the control activities category has the highest proportion of internal control 
weaknesses. Klamm and Watson (2009) classify material weaknesses reported under 
SOX Section 404 by COSO components and as information technology-related. Their 
findings also support the interrelationships between COSO components. 
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The Boyle et al. (2004) study predates OMB Circular A-133, which was re-issued 
in 1997 and increased the requirements for auditor testing and reporting on internal 
control over compliance. Further, the Boyle et al. sample is limited to a single state: 
Rhode Island state reports for an annual self-assessment summary for state agencies. The 
internal control weaknesses related to both financial and compliance findings with no 
distinction for the severity of control weaknesses. 
This study‘s sample period, fiscal year 2007, encompasses the current Circular 
and the increased focus on internal controls subsequent to SOX. The sample also comes 
from the population of counties in the United States with reported material weaknesses in 
internal control over compliance. Consequently, a diverse county sample allows a broad 
spectrum of federal programs to be included. This study uses the results from 
independent audits performed in accordance with Circular A-133 by auditors across the 
U.S. Federal agencies, and auditors will benefit from a study that points to the types of 
reported material weaknesses. The incremental contributions include the integration of 
COSO components with Circular A-133, a diverse sample, and a recent sample that 
incorporates updated audit guidance. 
2.4 Methodology 
Sample Selection 
The Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC), operated on behalf of the OMB, 
maintains an online database beginning in 1997 of single audit submissions. A query was 
performed to determine the number of general purpose counties
6
 that disclosed at least 
                                                          
6
 According to Wilson et al. (2007, 2), general purpose governments ―provide many categories of services 
to their residents (such as police and fire protection, sanitation, construction and maintenance of streets, 




one material weakness in internal control over compliance in fiscal year 2007. This time 
frame begins the implementation of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 112,
7
 
Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified in an Audit, which provides 
updated guidance for financial statement audits. As a result, the OMB amended Circular 
A-133 with SAS No. 112 internal control terminology effective for audits of periods 
ending on or after December 15, 2006 (AICPA 2008b). In addition, auditors updated their 
reports for Circular A-133 audits to comply with SAS No. 112 terminology (AICPA 
2008a). With SAS No. 112, the terminology for internal control weaknesses was updated 
from reportable conditions to significant deficiencies. 
Unlike the availability of financial reports filed under the SEC environment, there 
is no central database for single audit reports. For each county, comprehensive annual 
financial reports (CAFR), which generally include single audit sections, or separate 
single audit reports were hand collected. Some larger counties have their single audit 
information available on their web sites with state auditor web sites also providing a 
resource for county reports. A significant number of single audit reports were obtained 
after contacting the county by phone call to request reports.
8
  
The FAC database yielded 179 counties disclosing at least one material weakness 
in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular A-133 in fiscal 
year 2007.
 
See Table 2.2 for detailed statistics on observations. Observations for 
duplicate entities (1), consolidated city-county governments (1), incorrect FAC codings 
(4), and unavailable single audit reports (14) reduce the sample to 159 counties. Table 2.3 
                                                          
7
 SAS No. 112 was superseded by SAS No. 115 with an effective date of audit periods ending on or after 
December 15, 2009. The terms significant deficiency and material weakness are updated (AICPA 2009a). 
 
8
 A graduate student assisted with making initial telephone calls to request reports for approximately 20 
percent of the total population of counties. 
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shows the distribution of sample counties by state. Pennsylvania (11.3%) and California 
(10.7%) rank as having the most counties with material weaknesses in 2007.  
 
Table 2.2 - Summary of Sample Observations 
 
Population of counties with material weakness  179 
  Less:  Duplicate finding in related entity  (1) 
  Less:  Consolidated city-county government  (1) 
  177 
   
  Less:  Reports not available, per county contact  (3) 
  Less:  Incorrect material weakness coding on FAC   
            State material weakness  (1) 
            No material weakness in audit report  (3) 
  Less:  Unable to obtain single audit reports  (11) 









Alabama 1 0.6% 
Arizona 6 3.8% 
California 17 10.7% 
Colorado 9 5.7% 
Florida 5 3.1% 
Georgia 4 2.5% 
Hawaii 1 0.6% 
Illinois 12 7.5% 
Indiana 5 3.1% 
Iowa 3 1.9% 
Kansas 1 0.6% 
Kentucky 2 1.3% 
Louisiana 5 3.1% 
Maryland 1 0.6% 
Massachusetts 1 0.6% 
Michigan 5 3.1% 
Minnesota 4 2.5% 
Mississippi 7 4.4% 
Missouri 4 2.5% 
Montana 1 0.6% 
Nebraska 1 0.6% 
Nevada 1 0.6% 
New Mexico 1 0.6% 
New York 1 0.6% 
North Carolina 5 3.1% 
Ohio 13 8.2% 
Oklahoma 2 1.3% 
Oregon 1 0.6% 
Pennsylvania 18 11.3% 
South Carolina 4 2.5% 
Tennessee 1 0.6% 
Texas 1 0.6% 
Virginia 2 1.3% 
Washington 3 1.9% 
Wisconsin 9 5.7% 
Wyoming 2 1.3% 






The descriptions of material weaknesses are documented in the ―Schedule of 
Findings and Questioned Costs,‖ prepared by independent auditors and located in single 
audit reports. Each audit finding, including material weaknesses, includes information 
about the criteria or specific requirement on which the audit finding is based; the 
condition found; the amount of questioned costs, if any; information to provide 
perspective to judge the prevalence and consequences of the finding; the cause and effect; 
auditor recommendations to remedy the finding; and management‘s response (OMB 
2003, Section 510(b)). This descriptive information is used to classify the weaknesses 
into the COSO categories. 
First, material weaknesses are classified into the 14 compliance requirements, as 
prescribed in OMB Circular A-133, and shown in Table 2.4. Auditors provide this 
information in the audit finding description, or it is available on the FAC Data Collection 
Form online. Next, the material weaknesses are classified into the five categories of the 
COSO framework (control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information 
and communication, and monitoring). A single material weakness could be categorized 
into more than one component as supported by COSO‘s integrated framework. For 
example, issues with the preparation of the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards 
related to both inaccurate information and a lack of coordination between departments to 
accumulate the data serve as a joint influence of control activities and information and 
communication, resulting in two control component classifications. In contrast, a material 
weakness related to a lack of segregation of duties or a lack of reconciliations is classified 
into the single category of control activities. A McGladrey & Pullen, LLC practitioner 
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form designed specifically for single audits, ―Understanding of Internal Control 
Program,‖ was used as a guide to help classify the material weaknesses into the internal 
control categories. 
Cohen‘s kappa (1960) is used to test inter-coder reliability (Boyle et al. 2004; 
Klamm and Watson 2009). An independent coder classified a sample of material 
weakness findings. The kappa coefficient, representing inter-coder agreement is 0.62.
9
 
Landis and Koch (1977, 165) consider kappa statistics ranging from 0.61 to 0.80 as 
having ―substantial‖ agreement.  
2.5 Results 
Table 2.4 shows the frequency of material weaknesses across the 14 compliance 
requirements. In total, 159 counties reported 356 material weaknesses in internal control 
over compliance across 425 compliance requirement categories. As stated earlier, each 
designation is made by the auditor in regard to OMB Circular A-133 compliance 
requirements. Eighteen percent of the material weaknesses fall into the ‗other‘ category 
which means the reported condition does not adhere to the 14 specific compliance 
requirements and could relate to a general condition for the county that also applies to 
federal grant administration. For example, lack of segregation of duties may not relate to 
a single compliance requirement or even a specific grant program but its impact on 
federal grants causes its inclusion in the federal award findings. Reporting requirements 
are the next highest level of internal control weaknesses with 14 percent. Since all federal 
programs have some type of annual or quarterly reporting requirement, auditors routinely 
test this compliance area during single audits, and it is not surprising that weaknesses in 
this category are disclosed. In general, material weaknesses relate to a single compliance 
                                                          
9
  Pearson and Spearman correlations also indicate 0.62 correlations between coder responses. 
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requirement. Since the compliance supplement groups activities allowed and unallowed 
(category A) and allowable costs/cost principles (category B) together, most auditors 
jointly classify weaknesses in these areas. A proportions test confirms that the 
weaknesses are not evenly distributed among the 14 requirements (chi-square = 253.18;  
p < 0.0001). Results indicate that auditors are documenting and performing tests of 
internal control across the various compliance requirements. 
25 
 
Table 2.4 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into 14 OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Requirements 
 
Total                 
Number                 
of MW (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)  (e)   (f)   (g)   (h)   (i)   (j)   (k)  (l)  (m)   (n)   (p)   Total  
9 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 9 
9 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 10 
8 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 9 
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 10 
8 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
8 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 11 
8 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 10 
8 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 
7 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 10 
7 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 9 
7 3 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 11 
7 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 8 
6 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 
6 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 7 
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 
5 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 
5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 
4 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 
4 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
4 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 
3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 5 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
3 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
26 
 
Table 2.4 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into 14 OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Requirements 
 
Total                 
Number                 
of MW (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)  (e)   (f)   (g)   (h)   (i)   (j)   (k)  (l)  (m)   (n)   (p)   Total  
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
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Table 2.4 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into 14 OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Requirements 
 
Total                 
Number                 
of MW (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)  (e)   (f)   (g)   (h)   (i)   (j)   (k)  (l)  (m)   (n)   (p)   Total  
2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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Table 2.4 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into 14 OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Requirements 
 
Total                 
Number                 
of MW (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)  (e)   (f)   (g)   (h)   (i)   (j)   (k)  (l)  (m)   (n)   (p)   Total  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 2.4 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into 14 OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Requirements 
 
Total                 
Number                 
of MW (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)  (e)   (f)   (g)   (h)   (i)   (j)   (k)  (l)  (m)   (n)   (p)   Total  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
                 
356 34 50 30 9 53 8 12 9 29 3 2 60 25 25 76 425 
 
 
Legend of Compliance Requirements: 
a  = Activities allowed or unallowed 
b  = Allowable costs/cost principles 
c  = Cash Management 
d = Davis-Bacon Act 
e  = Eligibility 
f  = Equipment and real property management 
g  = Matching, level of effort, earmarking 
h  = Period of availability of federal funds 
i  = Procurement and suspension and debarment 
j  = Program income 
k  = Real property acquisition and relocation assistance 
l  = Reporting 
m  = Subrecipient monitoring 
n  = Special tests and provisions 
p  = Other (does not fall into 14 compliance requirements outlined in OMB Circular A-133) 
 
 
Table 2.5 presents the material weaknesses classified across the five internal 
control components with the 356 weaknesses categorized into 521 internal control 
components. Five is the greatest number of components into which any one material 
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weakness was classified. One county reported a weakness across various grant contracts 
and encompassing several internal control issues as a single weakness. The 
comprehensive nature of the audit finding caused the material weakness to include all 
five control components. Two counties had weaknesses with four components, and seven 
counties had three components. The remaining 97 percent of the weaknesses were 
considered as either one or two control components thereby indicating most weaknesses 
exist in specific control areas, with 58 percent classified into a single COSO category. 
Table 2.5 also shows that the most weaknesses are categorized into the control 
activities component. This one component represents 61percent (318 out of 521) of all 
material weaknesses classified in the study. In evaluating federal grants, auditors often 
test specific client procedures. For example, in testing eligibility determinations, 
participant files are reviewed to ensure specific procedures are followed and that 
supporting documentation is included. Therefore, deficiencies in files are likely related to 
control activities. The same holds true for auditor tests of required reports. The inability 
to reconcile reports to supporting documentation likely results from a breakdown in 
control activities. The next highest control component is the information and 
communication component with 22 percent (115 out of 521) of the weaknesses. The 
control unit with the fewest number of weakness classifications is risk assessment (6 out 
of 521). A proportions test confirms that the weaknesses are not evenly distributed among 
the five components (chi-square = 609.70; p < 0.0001). 
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Table 2.5 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into COSO Five Internal Control Components 
 
Total    Information  
Total 
Number 
Number Control Risk  Control  and  of Control 
of MW Environment Assessment Activities Communication Monitoring Components
a 
9 0 0 9 4 1 14 
9 0 0 6 1 3 10 
8 1 0 6 1 3 11 
8 1 0 6 2 0 9 
8 2 0 6 2 0 10 
8 1 0 7 2 0 10 
8 2 1 7 4 0 14 
8 1 0 6 3 0 10 
7 0 0 7 2 0 9 
7 0 0 7 1 0 8 
7 0 0 7 3 1 11 
7 1 0 7 1 1 10 
6 0 0 6 1 0 7 
6 2 0 6 1 1 10 
6 0 0 6 0 4 10 
5 0 0 5 2 0 7 
5 1 0 5 3 0 9 
5 0 0 4 1 1 6 
4 0 0 3 2 2 7 
4 0 0 4 0 0 4 
4 0 0 3 1 1 5 
4 1 0 3 1 2 7 
4 0 0 4 0 0 4 
3 1 0 3 2 0 6 
3 1 0 3 0 0 4 
3 0 0 3 3 0 6 
3 0 0 3 1 0 4 
3 0 0 3 3 0 6 
3 0 0 3 2 0 5 
3 0 0 3 0 0 3 
3 0 0 2 2 0 4 
3 0 0 3 1 0 4 
3 0 0 2 2 1 5 
3 0 1 2 0 1 4 
3 0 0 3 1 0 4 
3 0 0 3 1 0 4 
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Table 2.5 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into COSO Five Internal Control Components 
 
      Total 
Total    Information  Number 
Number Control Risk  Control  and  of Control 
of MW Environment Assessment Activities Communication Monitoring Components
a 
3 1 0 2 0 1 4 
3 0 0 3 3 0 6 
3 0 0 3 0 0 3 
3 0 0 3 0 0 3 
3 0 0 2 0 1 3 
3 0 0 3 1 0 4 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 2 0 4 
2 0 0 1 2 0 3 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 2 1 5 
2 0 0 2 2 0 4 
2 1 0 2 1 0 4 
2 0 0 1 0 1 2 
2 0 0 2 2 0 4 
2 1 0 1 0 0 2 
2 0 0 1 1 0 2 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 1 1 2 2 0 6 
2 1 0 1 0 1 3 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 1 0 1 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2 1 0 2 1 0 4 
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2 1 0 1 0 0 2 
2 0 0 1 1 0 2 
2 0 0 2 1 1 4 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
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Table 2.5 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into COSO Five Internal Control Components 
 
      Total 
Total    Information  Number 
Number Control Risk  Control  and  of Control 
of MW Environment Assessment Activities Communication Monitoring Components
a 
2 0 0 1 0 1 2 
2 1 0 2 0 1 4 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
2 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2 0 0 2 1 0 3 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Table 2.5 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into COSO Five Internal Control Components 
 
      Total 
Total    Information  Number 
Number Control Risk  Control  and  of Control 
of MW Environment Assessment Activities Communication Monitoring Components
a 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 2 
1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 1 1 1 0 1 4 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 1 0 1 0 1 3 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Table 2.5 - Frequency of Material Weaknesses Reported by 159 U.S. Counties - 
Categorized into COSO Five Internal Control Components 
 
      Total 
Total    Information  Number 
Number Control Risk  Control  and  of Control 
of MW Environment Assessment Activities Communication Monitoring Components
a 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
       
356 35 6 318 115 47 521 
 6.72% 1.15% 61.04% 22.07% 9.02% 100.00% 
 
a
Material weaknesses may be categorized into more than one control component. 
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The five internal control components are correlated across the 356 material 
weaknesses to determine whether the categorization in any one component is related to 
simultaneous categorization in any other component (Boyle et al. 2004). As presented in 
Table 2.6, the only positive correlations are between the risk assessment component with 
both the control environment (rs = 0.177; p = 0.001) and monitoring (rs = 0.142;  
p = 0.007) components. Negative relationships are observed for all other correlations 
which suggest that the classification in one component means non-categorization in the 
other components (Boyle et al. 2004). 
Correlations in Table 2.6 also test whether the types of material weaknesses are 
related to the size of the counties, as measured by total federal expenditures. Correlations 
between the five categories and the total federal expenditures indicate marginally 
significant relationships between total federal expenditures and risk assessment  
(rs = -0.096; p = 0.071) and control activities (rs = 0.094; p = 0.076). As the size of 
federal programs increase, the likelihood of weaknesses in control activities also 
increases. The negative relation between risk assessment and federal expenditures is 




Table 2.6 - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for COSO Internal Control Elements 
and Total Federal Expenditures by Material Weaknesses (n = 356) 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
(1) Control Environment 1.000        
        
(2) Risk Assessment  0.177 1.000     
  (0.001)      
(3) Control Activities -0.344 -0.025 1.000    
  (0.000) (0.633)     
(4) Info. & Communication  -0.107 0.050 -0.034 1.000   
  (0.044) (0.351) (0.528)    
(5) Monitoring  0.094 0.142 -0.295 -0.198 1.000  
  (0.076) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)   
(6) Total Fed. Expenditures -0.079 -0.096 0.094 0.044 -0.029 1.000 
  (0.138) (0.071) (0.076) (0.411) (0.589)  
 
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 This paper uses the COSO internal control framework to analyze 356 material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance reported by 159 counties. Results both 
support and extend prior research (Boyle et al. 2004; Klamm and Wilson 2009) that use 
the COSO framework to categorize internal control weaknesses. This study finds that 
weaknesses are not evenly distributed across the five control components. As with Boyle 
et al. (2004), the control activities category has the highest proportion of identified 
weaknesses (61 percent). Klamm and Wilson (2009) find that all of the firms with weak 
information technology controls have a weak control activities component. The results of 
this study confirm that actual control activities performed are an essential element of the 
internal control system and auditors are most likely to report their deficiencies. Because 
the proportion of control activity weaknesses in this study (61%) are significantly higher 
than the proportion in the Boyle et al. (2004) study (31%), compliance requirements 
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under OMB Circular A-133 may encourage more auditor testing in this area thereby 
resulting in more reported internal control weaknesses. 
While Boyle et al. (2004) find the lowest proportion of weaknesses under the 
monitoring component, this study of federal grant control weaknesses finds the lowest 
proportion of weaknesses under risk assessment (6 %). Tests are performed to determine 
whether county size, as measured by the total amount of federal expenditures influenced 
weaknesses in the five components. Results show that risk assessment and control 
activity weaknesses are associated with the size of county federal grant expenditures. The 
larger the county, the higher the likelihood that the single audit report discloses a 
weakness in control activities. Risk assessment has a negative relation with county size 
which means that smaller counties have more weaknesses under the risk assessment 
component. 
 The sample for this study includes a national sample with a single entity type for a 
consistent type of internal control weakness. In contrast, the Boyle et al. (2004) sample 
includes 32 state departments from a single state with varying degrees of internal control 
weaknesses for both financial statement and compliance audits. While the study results 
are similar, the uniform sample in this study brings clarity to material weaknesses 
reported for single audits and suggests results are similar across the U.S. The 
concentration of material weaknesses classified as control activities stresses the 
importance for county managers to evaluate existing policies and procedures to ensure 
they are designed to prevent and detect weaknesses in this area. Study results also point 
auditors to susceptible areas and challenge them to discern whether they are neglecting 
other internal control components in their targeted audit tests.  
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Since the issuance of the Internal Control – Integrated Framework in 1992, 
COSO has evolved and changed with the nature of the business environment. With the 
passage of SOX in 2002, registered companies have annual management certifications 
and independent audit opinions on the effectiveness of internal control systems over 
financial reporting. The COSO framework is widely used to meet those requirements. In 
2004 COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework to address 
―risks and opportunities affecting value creation or preservation‖ (COSO 2004, 2). 
Similar to the internal control framework, enterprise risk management (ERM) consists of 
interrelated components, but distinctively, ERM focuses on the identification, 
assessment, and management of risk. The eight components include the internal 
environment, objective setting, event identification, risk assessment, risk response, 
control activities, information and communication, and monitoring (COSO 2004). 
While the private sector has begun to embrace the ERM framework, its objectives 
have not filtered to the federal grant environment. This study indicates that few material 
weaknesses involve risk assessment. Unless the risks are more prevalent in the financial 
reporting side of the audit, this is a viable area for exploration by county managers, 
grantor agencies, and the federal government. 
 An observation after analyzing 356 material weaknesses relates to the lack of 
uniformity of material weakness disclosures. Some counties isolate each internal control 
weakness as a separate finding while other counties combine various weaknesses for a 
single grant or report a similar weakness across several federal programs as a single 
finding. Details of individual findings also point to an inconsistency in the types of 
internal control weaknesses elevated to material weaknesses. For example, while one 
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county may detail pervasive control issues as a material weakness, another county 
describes one exception in a sample of 40 participant files and concludes as a material 
weakness. Authoritative guidance should prescribe more specific guidelines to aid 
auditors in reporting uniform internal control weakness disclosures. 
 Future research can examine a different entity type, such as municipalities, 
colleges and universities, or not-for-profit organizations, to classify internal control 
weaknesses in order to determine whether single audit procedures focus primarily on 
control activities. In addition, the same procedures of classifying weaknesses into the 
COSO categories could be performed with significant deficiencies and compared to the 
results in this study using material weaknesses. The classification of material weaknesses 
in this study could be used in future research to determine entity or auditor characteristics 





Determinants of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control over Compliance in 
Accordance with OMB Circular A-133 for U.S. Counties 
 
Abstract:  
This study investigates the determinants of material weaknesses in internal control 
over compliance with federal grants for U.S. counties reporting described material 
weaknesses in fiscal year 2007. Specifically, it examines whether a reported material 
weakness in internal control for federal grants is associated with the following county 
characteristics: (1) size, (2) financial health, (3) complexity, and (4) the presence of a 
material weakness in the financial statements. Using logistic regression models to test 
four hypotheses, empirical results indicate that financially weak and complex counties are 
more likely to report material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. In 
addition, counties with material weaknesses in financial statements are more likely to 
report material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. County size is not a 
significant factor. Determinants also are studied based on specific types of material 
weaknesses mapped to the five internal control components. Counties that report material 
weaknesses under control activities have similar results to the overall sample. In contrast, 
counties with weaknesses in the information and communication component find a higher 
likelihood of material weaknesses with counties that have no bond debt. The results of 
this exploratory study add to the sparse body of literature related to federal grants and 
provide opportunities for future research in discovering other determinants for material 





Historically, counties are administrative units of states and provide services of the 
state. Delivering services to both urban and unincorporated areas, county services have 
changed over time. Counties administer federal grants for a broad range of programs 
including education, police and fire protection, highway and road projects, and 
community development programs. The varied program activities lead to different types 
of federal grants audited and reported on each year, and they represent a wide spectrum 
of federal grantor agencies. Internal control weaknesses in grant programs can lead to 
ineligible program participants as well as fraud and abuse. 
Auditors of federal grants have been required to report material weaknesses in 
internal control over compliance since the Single Audit Act of 1984 (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1984). Entities subject to these audit requirements expend over $500,000 
in federal awards each year (OMB 2003). As part of the single audit, auditors evaluate 
internal controls over compliance requirements in accordance with OMB Circular A-133. 
They then issue a report on compliance with requirements applicable to each major 
federal program and on internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB 
Circular A-133, with internal control deficiencies, if any, disclosed. With federal grant 
outlays to state and local governments estimated at $645 billion for fiscal year 2011 
(OMB 2010), this is an important research area. Despite the magnitude of federal funds, 
no research explores the determinants of material weaknesses related to federal grants. 
This paper examines the determinants of reporting material weaknesses in internal 





 or combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote 
likelihood that material noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a 
federal program will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal control‖ 
(AICPA 2008a, 247).
2
 A sample of 318 U.S. counties including 159 that disclosed at least 
one material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133 for major federal programs and 159 that 
did not is used to explore entity characteristics associated with material weaknesses. This 
study examines whether material weaknesses in internal control over compliance are 
associated with (1) size; (2) financial health; (3) complexity; and (4) the presence of a 
material weakness in the financial statements.  
To test whether entity characteristics increase the likelihood that a material 
weakness in internal control over compliance will be disclosed, a logistic regression 
model is used to test hypotheses. Primary findings include that counties with material 
weaknesses over federal grants are financially weak, complex, and have material 
weaknesses on their financial statements. No significant relation is found between county 
size and the reporting of material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. In 
addition, this study examines the specific types of material weaknesses and how the 
determinants of internal control weaknesses differ based on these types. Material 
weaknesses are classified into the five categories of an internal control framework: 
                                                          
1
 A significant deficiency is ―a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that adversely 
affects the entity‘s ability to administer a federal program such that there is more than a remote likelihood 
that noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program that is more than 
inconsequential will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal control‖ (AICPA 2008a, 247). 
 
2
 Subsequent to the study‘s sample period, the definition of material weakness was revised. Issued in 
December 2009, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 117, ―Compliance Audits,‖ changed the definition 
from ―more than a remote likelihood‖ to ―a reasonable possibility‖ (AICPA 2009b). This change does not 
impact the results of this study. 
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control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, 
and monitoring. Available sample sizes limit the evaluation to counties with control 
activities and information and communication findings. Counties with material 
weaknesses for control activities yield the same empirical results as the full sample. 
Counties with information and communication material weaknesses exhibit a different 
pattern for financial health as counties without bonds more likely to have a material 
weakness. 
Audit findings, including material weakness disclosures, can impact grant 
funding. For example, the Boone County Fire Protection District was ordered to repay 
$752,453 in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant funds after an audit 
disclosed unallowable expenses (Rogers 2009). Similarly, Cascade County, Montana‘s 
2009 audit resulted in questioned federal grant expenditures exceeding $220,000 for 
violations of grant provisions and equipment purchases from related parties (Puckett 
2010). ―The questionable equipment and construction spending were ‗significant 
deficiencies‘ in the county‘s internal financial controls,‖ and repayment requirements will 
be accessed later by grantor agencies (Puckett 2010). Public disclosure of such punitive 
actions is rare, however, as governments at local, state, and federal levels prefer not to 
expose grant administrative vulnerabilities. In most cases, audit findings addressed within 
the grantor oversight system are not made public. 
Nevertheless, single audit findings may prompt grantor agencies to perform their 
own program audits. State or federal agency auditors may identify more findings thereby 
requiring additional funds to be repaid or increased monitoring activities (Fisher 2009). 
In following up on single audit findings reported by a private CPA firm for Laurel 
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County, the Auditor‘s Office for Kentucky found improprieties in bid procedures for 
equipment purchased for ten counties totaling $1.8 million (Luallen 2009). Therefore, 
understanding determining factors for audit findings is important. 
Agency theory asserts that contracted agents have divergent interests from 
stockholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Safeguards are needed to protect investors 
from opportunistic behavior of managers. In contrast to agency theory, stewardship 
theory holds that managers will choose achievements of organizational interests over 
self-serving interests (Davis et al. 1997). Under stewardship theory, managers strive for 
doing a good job and being a steward of firm assets (Donaldson and Davis 1991).  
Unlike for-profit settings, governmental and nonprofit settings do not have 
shareholders demanding high returns on investments (Caers et al. 2006). In the case of 
federal grants, principals include both grantor agencies who award federal funds to 
counties and local citizens whose taxpayer dollars are used to fund the grants. County 
governments that administer federal grants are placed in the agent position. Prior research 
using government and nonprofit settings finds agency and stewardship theories as 
complementary theories (Davis et al. 1997; Van Slyke 2007; Lambright 2009), and 
Lambright (2009) posits that agents are at neither extreme of the continuum. Annual 
audits help monitor federal outlays with reported findings highlighting weaknesses in 
internal control.  
While Doyle et al. (2007) evaluate the determinants of material weaknesses in 
internal control over financial reporting for registered companies, no study has evaluated 
the determinants of material weaknesses in internal control for compliance in accordance 
with OMB Circular A-133. This study extends research in internal controls over 
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compliance for single audits. Jakubowski (1995) examines internal control weaknesses in 
federal programs for local governments in the four-year period after the passage of the 
Single Audit Act of 1984. His findings reveal that counties report more internal control 
weaknesses than cities and the frequency of control weaknesses declined for cities but not 
counties during the sample period. Also, state auditors reported more findings than public 
accounting firms (Jakubowski 1995). Lopez and Peters (2010) investigate differences in 
auditor types for this type of reported material weakness for counties and municipalities. 
They find that CPA firms are more likely to report material weaknesses than are 
government auditors. Extant research evaluates material weaknesses under Sections 302 
and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 (Chan et al. 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; 
Doyle et al. 2007; Bryan and Lilien 2005) for private companies, but little has been done 
to study single audit material weaknesses. The objective of this study is to bridge the gap 
between studies of material weaknesses under SOX and studies of material weaknesses 
under OMB Circular A-133. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section includes 
background on internal control and prior research, followed by the hypotheses 
development. The fourth section provides the research methodology and information 
relating to the sample selection. The fifth section reports the results. The final section 




3.2 Background of Internal Control and Prior Research 
 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
3
 (COSO) issued Internal Control—
Integrated Framework in 1992 to establish a common definition of internal control and to 
provide an industry standard. The report defines internal control as:  
a process, effected by an entity‘s board of directors, management, and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the following categories: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations; (2) reliability of financial reporting; and (3) compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations (COSO 1992). 
 
Internal control consists of five interrelated components: control environment, 
risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. First, 
the control environment sets the tone of an organization and is the foundation for the 
other components. Second, risk assessment describes management‘s process for 
identifying and responding to business risks faced by the organization. Third, control 
activities are policies and procedures to help ensure management directives are 
implemented. Fourth, information and communication refer to the identification, capture, 
and communication of pertinent, timely information. Finally, monitoring is the process to 
assess the quality of internal controls over time (COSO 1992). 
An effective internal control environment can help ensure reliable financial 
reporting. Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S. House of Representatives 
2002) requires registered firms to disclose material weaknesses in internal controls. SOX 
Section 404 requires management and auditors to report on internal controls over 
financial reporting (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). With the public availability of 
SOX Sections 302 and 404 report disclosures, recent research has focused on various 
                                                          
3
 The sponsoring organizations include the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Executives International, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and 
the Institute of Management Accountants. 
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associations with material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Extant 
research indicates that firms with material weaknesses tend to be smaller, financially 
weaker, and more complex (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 
2005).  
Other studies analyze relationships between internal control deficiencies with 
various company elements. Chan et al. (2008) show evidence that internal control 
weaknesses are related to earnings management. Hermanson et al. (2008) examine 
company remediation efforts when material weaknesses in internal controls are related to 
revenue recognition. In addition, studies focus on the effects of internal control weakness 
firms with audit fees (Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hoitash 
et al. 2008) and corporate governance (Hoitash et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2007). 
With research on internal control weaknesses under SOX Sections 302 and 404, 
the focus is publicly-held (registered) companies. The Single Audit Act (SAA) of 1984 
first required a report over internal controls over compliance for major federal programs,
4
 
and material weaknesses, if any, were disclosed (U.S. House of Representatives 1984). 
When the OMB Circular A-133 was revised in 1997 to establish consistency and 
uniformity with single audits of states, local governments, and non-profit organizations 
pursuant to the SAA of 1984 and the SAA Amendments of 1996, the required audit 
report on internal controls over compliance remained (OMB 2003). The Circular lists 14 
compliance requirements
5
 which must be evaluated, if applicable, to the grant program. 
                                                          
4
 Major programs are determined by a risk-based approach and usually include the grants with the largest 
annual expenditures. Auditors document and perform tests of internal controls and compliance for major 
programs, and have no responsibility under Circular A-133 for nonmajor programs. 
 
5
 Fourteen categories include (a) activities allowed or unallowed (b) allowable costs/cost principles (c) cash 
management (d) Davis-Bacon Act (e) eligibility (f) equipment and real property management (g) matching, 
level of effort, earmarking (h) period of availability of Federal funds (i) procurement and suspension and 
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Internal control framework components (i.e., control environment, risk assessment, 
control activities, information and communication, and monitoring) are evaluated for 
each compliance requirement that is material to a major program. Auditors state opinions 
over these controls and report any internal control deficiencies. Internal control 
weaknesses are classified as significant deficiencies or material weaknesses.  
Lopez and Peters (2010) study the association between auditor type and internal 
control deficiencies under OMB Circular A-133 using a sample of cities and counties. 
Jakubowski (1995) evaluates frequencies associated with internal control weaknesses 
with both entity type and auditor type in the mid-1980s after the passage of the SAA of 
1984. However, no studies examine whether entity characteristics are associated with 
reported internal control weaknesses for single audits.  
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Publicly-held companies with material weaknesses in internal control over 
financial reporting are smaller firms, indicating entity size is a factor when considering 
internal control weaknesses (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 
2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). This study investigates whether an association 
between size and internal control weaknesses also carries over to county governments. 
Large counties house internal audit departments that may aid in maintaining strong 
internal control. In addition, large counties tend to be more complex with a larger number 
and variety of transactions. As discussed below, this study explicitly controls for 
complexity in statistical tests. As a result, fewer control weaknesses are expected in large 
counties after controlling for complexity. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
debarment (j) program income (k) real property acquisition and relocation assistance (l) reporting (m) 
subrecipient monitoring (n) special tests and provisions (OMB Circular A-133, Subpart E). 
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As with small companies, smaller counties may lack adequate staff for proper 
segregation of duties, for example, and may lack adequate resources to implement proper 
controls. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that smaller counties are more likely to have 
material weaknesses in internal controls over compliance. Prior research uses the natural 
log of total revenues as a metric for government size (Johnson et al. 2002; Ward et al. 
1994; Copley 1989). Due to the exploratory nature of this size, total revenues are 
considered as a proxy for size along with total federal expenditures (Lopez and Peters 
2010) since the study relates directly to federal grants. The first hypothesis, stated in 
alternate form, is as follows. 
H1: A material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 is more likely when a county is smaller in size, as 
measured by financial operations. 
 
Material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting are more likely in 
financially weak companies (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 
2005). Moreover, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find that disclosers of internal control 
deficiencies typically are under financial distress. This study tests whether this holds true 
for counties. Giroux and McLelland (2003) measure the financial viability of cities as the 
ratio of general fund equity divided by general fund revenues. They posit that the ratio is 
an empirical surrogate for financial condition and an analog to retained earnings for a 
commercial firm. Governmental entities, however, do not have a ‗bottom line‘ like 
private sector firms. The financial objectives of a governmental activity are to cover 
outlays and to focus on the near-term impact (GFOA 2006). Therefore, a ratio taken from 
the financial statements of a single governmental fund is insufficient to determine the 
financial strength of a county. 
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Instead, financial strength is measured using bond and credit ratings (Rubin 
1988). Palumbo et al. (2006) examine the factors affecting a municipality‘s bond rating 
and find that bond rating agencies look at factors outside the financial statements. Raters 
research economic and demographic characteristics, constraints posed by or dependence 
on other government units, and debt levels and other financial factors in addition to the 
fiscal condition of the local government (Palumbo et al. 2006). Because bond ratings 
encompass an overall assessment of local governments, they are used to measure 
financial strength. Indicating financial weakness, lower bond ratings are expected to be 
associated with material weaknesses. The second hypothesis is stated in alternate form, as 
follows. 
H2: A material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 is more likely when a county is financially weak. 
 
Doyle et al. (2007) find that material weaknesses in internal control over financial 
reporting are more likely in firms that have more complex operations, as measured by the 
number of special purpose entities, the number of business segments, and foreign 
transactions. In looking at factors influencing the disclosure of internal control 
deficiencies, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) posit that the complexity of firm operations 
makes it more difficult to structure adequate internal controls. They measure complexity 
as the number of business segments and foreign sales, and find that disclosers have 
complex operations. As pointed out by Ge and McVay (2005), companies with more 
complicated transactions have more opportunities for financial reporting issues which 
may lead to material weaknesses.  
Because studies of private companies find complex operations associated with 
internal control weaknesses, this study examines whether this characteristic extends to 
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governmental entities. No other study has examined this possible association. 
Researchers evaluate complexity in municipalities in studies of audit report timing 
(McLelland and Giroux 2000) and determinants of audit fees (Rubin 1988; Ward et al. 
1994). The number of component units is used as a measure of complexity (Johnson et al. 
2002; McLelland and Giroux 2000). According to Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) Statement No. 14 (1991), a component unit is a legally separate, tax-
exempt organization for which the elected officials of the primary government are 
financially responsible. GASB Statement No. 39 amends GASB Statement No. 14 and 
requires organizations that raise and hold economic resources for the direct benefit of a 
government unit are reported as component units (GASB 2002). Johnson et al. (2002) use 
component units as an analogy to subsidiaries in corporate literature as a measure used to 
indicate complexity (Turpen 1990). As the number of component units increases, the 
entity‘s complexity increases. The third hypothesis, stated in alternate form, is as follows. 
H3: A material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 is more likely when a county has complex operations. 
 
Government Auditing Standards defines a material weakness in internal control 
over financial reporting as indicating a ―more than remote likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the financial statements will not be prevented or detected‖ (GAO 2007, 
83). Weak controls related to financial reporting may signal weak controls over grant 
administration. That is, a weakness in internal control over financial reporting could 
indicate that a material weakness in internal control over compliance for federal grants 
also may be present. The county‘s overall control environment may be weak. 
Consequently, Hypothesis 4 predicts that a material weakness in internal control over 
compliance in accordance with OMB Circular A-133 is more likely when a material 
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weakness in the financial statements is reported. The fourth hypothesis, stated in alternate 
form, is as follows. 
H4: A material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 is more likely when a material weakness is reported for 




 The sample is selected from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC) of the U.S. 
Census Bureau (http://harvester.census.gov/sac/). This database includes single audit 
results and related federal grant information since 1997. The selected sample includes 
counties (general purpose
6
) for fiscal year 2007, two decades after the implementation of 
Circular A-133, as amended to cover all federal grant recipients. Counties administer a 
diverse group of grant programs such as highway construction, education, social services, 
and housing. Consequently, a varied group of federal programs are represented in county 
operations. 
The sample time frame begins the implementation of Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No. 112,
7
 Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified 
in an Audit, which provides updated guidance for financial statement audits. The OMB 
amended Circular A-133 with SAS No. 112 internal control terminology effective for 
single audits of periods ending on or after December 15, 2006 (AICPA 2008b). In 
addition, the AICPA updated its illustrative auditor‘s reports for single audits to comply 
                                                          
6
 Wilson et al. (2007, 2) states that general purpose governments ―provide many categories of services to 
their residents (such as police and fire protection, sanitation, construction and maintenance of streets, roads, 
and bridges, and health and welfare.‖  
 
7
 SAS No. 112 is superseded by SAS No. 115 with an effective date of audit periods ending on or after 
December 15, 2009. The terms significant deficiency and material weakness are updated (AICPA 2009a). 
54 
 
with SAS No. 112 terminology (AICPA 2008a). SAS No. 112 changes the terminology 
for internal control weaknesses from reportable conditions to significant deficiencies.  
The FAC database yields 179 counties disclosing at least one material weakness 
in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular A-133 in fiscal 
year 2007.
 
See Table 3.1 for detailed statistics on observations. Observations for 
duplicate entities (1), consolidated city-county governments (1), incorrect FAC codings 
(4), and unavailable audit reports (12) reduce the sample to 161 counties. In addition, box 
plot diagrams for the population show Los Angeles County as an extreme outlier in terms 
of total federal expenditures, and it is excluded from the population of counties with 
material weaknesses. While Oklahoma has two counties with material weaknesses in 
internal control over compliance, only one county is available as a match, thereby 
reducing the sample to 159. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of sample counties by state. 
Pennsylvania (11.9%) and California (10.1%) rank as having the most counties with 
material weaknesses in 2007.  
To determine entity characteristics associated with material weaknesses in 
internal control over compliance, a matched pair control sample of counties not 
disclosing material weaknesses in fiscal year 2007 is used. While Palepu (1986) argues 
that using matched samples may lead to biased parameter estimates, using matched pairs 
is a research design choice. The only alternative is to use a county as its own control and 
make a cross-sectional examination before and after a point in time.
8
 A matched sample 
assumes the entities are matched on all attributes except the experimental treatment and 
obvious controls. Both designs have weaknesses, and the matched pair method is adopted 
                                                          
8
 The assumption is that a year is used when the entity is not undergoing any other structural change 
(except the experimental treatment). 
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to enable hand collection of control group financial reports. To control for the effects of 
regional differences, pairs are matched based on geography. States with counties 
reporting material weaknesses are matched to states with counties not reporting material 
weaknesses. Once the number of needed control counties is determined for each state, a 
random sample is obtained from those counties without material weaknesses in 
corresponding states.  
 
Table 3.1 - Summary of Sample Observations 
 
Population of counties with material weakness  179 
   
Less:  Duplicate finding in related entity    (1) 
          Consolidated city-county government    (1) 
Less:  Incorrect material weakness coding on FAC   
            State material weakness    (1) 
            No material weakness in audit report    (3) 
Less:  Unable to obtain audit reports  (12) 
  161 
Less:  Extreme outlier    (1) 
          County without available state match    (1) 
Material weakness sample  159 
   
Matched control sample  159 









Alabama 2 0.6% 
Arizona 12 3.8% 
California 32 10.1% 
Colorado 18 5.7% 
Florida 10 3.1% 
Georgia 8 2.5% 
Hawaii 2 0.6% 
Illinois 24 7.5% 
Indiana 10 3.1% 
Iowa 6 1.9% 
Kansas 2 0.6% 
Kentucky 4 1.3% 
Louisiana 10 3.1% 
Maryland 4 1.3% 
Massachusetts 2 0.6% 
Michigan 10 3.1% 
Minnesota 8 2.5% 
Mississippi 14 4.4% 
Missouri 8 2.5% 
Montana 2 0.6% 
Nebraska 2 0.6% 
Nevada 2 0.6% 
New Mexico 2 0.6% 
New York 2 0.6% 
North Carolina 10 3.1% 
Ohio 26 8.2% 
Oklahoma 2 0.6% 
Oregon 2 0.6% 
Pennsylvania 38 11.9% 
South Carolina 8 2.5% 
Tennessee 2 0.6% 
Texas 2 0.6% 
Virginia 4 1.3% 
Washington 6 1.9% 
Wisconsin 18 5.7% 
Wyoming 4 1.3% 




Material Weakness Classifications 
 
While this study focuses on material weaknesses, additional tests evaluate 
whether the types of internal control weaknesses are relevant. Doyle et al. (2007, 4) ―find 
that the type of internal control problem is an important factor when examining 
determinants,‖ and partition their sample by classifying material weakness types into 
categories of severity (account-specific and transaction-level or company-level) and 
underlying reasons (staffing, complexity, or general) using descriptions in Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. This study uses the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) internal control framework to classify material weaknesses and 
partitions the sample based on the descriptions of each material weakness. This 
information is obtained from the first dissertation paper that categorizes material 
weaknesses over compliance for counties in fiscal year 2007. An exploratory approach is 
taken to study how determinants may vary among the different types of material 
weakness disclosures. 
Research Design 
Following prior research (Lopez and Peters 2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; 
Doyle et al. 2007), a logistic regression framework is used to model the probability that a 
material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular 
A-133 is disclosed. Logistic regression is used to predict the probability of an event 
occurrence. Using a dichotomous dependent variable, this study predicts the probability 
of whether a county discloses a material weakness in internal control over compliance 
with a set of chosen independent variables. The dependent variable is expected to be 
nonlinear with one of more of the independent variables. Probabilities lie between 0 and 
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1 with 0.5 as the value in which both outcomes are equally likely. While probit models 
specify a normal distribution, logit and probit models are very similar and often produce 
the same results (Kennedy 2008). While sensitivity tests ultimately demonstrate the 
similarities, prior research historically uses logistic models for qualitative dependent 
variables. The logistic regression model is used to estimate the coefficients and statistical 
significance of each variable and is given below.  
 
MW_MP =  +  SIZE +  BOND +  INSUR_ONLY +  
 NO_BOND_DEBT +  UNRATED_BONDS +  
 COMPLEX +  MW_FS +  FF_CHANGE +  
 MW_PY +  LN (POP)+  LN (INCOME) +  




MW_MP  = Material weakness in internal control over compliance in  
accordance with OMB Circular A-133 disclosed for major  
program (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
SIZE   = Measured as the natural log of dollar amount of total entity  
    revenues, LN (TOTAL REV), or the natural log of dollar  
    amount of total federal expenditures, LN(TOTFEDEXPEND) 
BOND   = Bond rating as an ordinal variable indicates financial health 
    (1 = AAA rating with increasing numbers decreasing bond  
    ratings; see Appendix) 
INSUR_ONLY = Counties with only insured bonds thereby having AAA  
    ratings (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
NO_BOND_DEBT = Counties with no outstanding bond debt  
    (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
UNRATED_BONDS = Counties with bonds that are not rated  
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
COMPLEX  = Number of component units 
MW_FS  = Material weakness on the financial statements disclosed  
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
FF_CHANGE = Percentage change in total federal expenditures from 2006  
    to 2007 
MW_PY  = Presence of material weakness over federal grants in prior  
    year (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
LN (POP)  = Natural log of county population in 2007 
LN (INCOME) = Natural log of per capita income level of county residents  
    in 2007 
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AWARD  =  County received the GFOA CAFR Certificate Award for  
    fiscal year 2007 (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
    Error term 
 
 
The dependent variable is the disclosure of a material weakness in internal control 
over compliance. MW_MP is coded as 1 if the county has at least one material weakness 
and 0 if the county is in the control group. MW_MP is determined by a query in the 
Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC) database. Based on theory and prior literature the 
following variables are included in the model, but other unknown variables may be 




The first hypothesis tests whether county size, SIZE, is associated with material 
weaknesses. County size is initially measured by the natural log of total entity revenues. 
Prior research uses the natural log of total revenues as a metric for government size 
(Johnson et al. 2002; Ward et al. 1994; Copley 1989). Log transformations are used for 
SIZE variables because the size effect is expected to diminish as size increases. Revenue 
information is obtained from the Statement of Activities found in the county‘s 
comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR) or financial statements. County financial 
reports are hand collected using county web sites or phone call requests to county 
governments for electronic or hard copies. In addition, SIZE is measured as the total 
amount of total federal expenditures since the study is specific to federal grant programs 
(Lopez and Peters 2010). Total federal expenditure amounts are obtained from the FAC 
database. Consistent with prior research on private companies (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and 
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McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 2005), smaller counties are expected to be more likely to 
disclose material weaknesses.  
The second hypothesis tests whether a county‘s financial health is associated with 
material weaknesses. Financially weak counties are expected to be more likely to disclose 
material weaknesses. Financial strength is determined first through underlying bond 
ratings. Bond ratings are found from the bond rating agencies Moody‘s, Standard & 
Poor‘s and/or Fitch Investor‘s Service. Jiang (2008) outlines a bond and credit rating 
system that ranks debt ratings into numerical values. Using Jiang‘s system, the Appendix 
presents ordinal variable transformations from agency bond ratings to measure BOND. 
Since higher numbers indicate lower bond ratings, a positive relation is expected between 
BOND and MW_MP.  
When counties obtain bond insurance, their bonds are rated automatically as AAA 
(Peng 2002). Unless counties request an underlying rating from rating agencies for non-
insured bonds, however, a rating is not made. Therefore, some counties have ratings only 
for insured bonds. INSUR_ONLY is an indicator variable coded as 1 when counties have 
only insured bonds, and 0 otherwise. Because counties with insured-only bonds have no 
variability in ratings, and their true financial health is unknown, no direction is predicted 
for this variable. Next, some counties have bonds that are not rated so queries in the three 
rating agency web sites yield no bond ratings. Allen et al. (2009) posit that local 
governments that forgo bond ratings would receive lower ratings. Therefore, a positive 
relation is predicted between UNRATED_BONDS and MW_MP. UNRATED_BONDS 
is an indicator variable coded as 1 when counties have unrated bonds, and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, some counties have no bonds. They finance operations and equipment with 
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current revenues, capital leases, or bank debt. NO_BOND_DEBT is an indicator variable 
coded as 1 when counties have no bonds, and 0 otherwise. Because counties without 
bonds are deemed to be in better financial health, a negative relation is predicted for this 
variable. 
The complexity of a county, COMPLEX, is measured as the number of 
component units. This information is gathered directly from the notes to the financial 
statements. A county‘s complexity is expected to be associated with material weakness 
disclosures, as outlined in the third hypothesis. The fourth hypothesis correlates the 
disclosure of a material weakness on the financial statements with a material weakness in 
internal controls over compliance of major programs. MW_FS is an indicator variable 
coded as a 1 if a material weakness is disclosed in regard to financial reporting and 0 
otherwise. This information is obtained from the FAC database. It is hypothesized that 
there will be a positive relation between MW_FS and MW_MP.  
Control Variables 
Doyle et al. (2007) examine the association between material weaknesses and 
rapid company growth. For counties, the percentage change in total federal expenditures 
for a one-year period, as denoted by FF_CHANGE is used to test that association. The 
change in expenditures is obtained from the FAC‘s listing of federal expenditures in 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007.  
The reporting of a material weakness in the prior year may influence the 
disclosure of a material weakness in the test year as a repeated material weakness could 
indicate a weak control environment. The presence of a material weakness in the prior 
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year also is determined through the FAC database. An indicator variable, MW_ PY, is 
equal to 1 for a material weakness in the prior year, and 0 otherwise. 
Next, the natural log of population, LN (POP), is included as a control variable. 
Population statistics are found in the ‗Statistical Section‘ of the CAFR. As an alternate 
data source, the U.S. Census Bureau maintains county population estimates and makes 
them available on their web site. In addition, population serves as an alternate variable to 
test county size. Public sector literature uses population as a proxy for size (Styles and 
Tennyson 2007; Gore 2004; McLelland and Giroux 2000; Copley 1991; Ingram 1984). 
Copley (1989), however, notes that revenues may serve as a better proxy for size. He 
contends that ―differences in revenues capture variations in services provided to citizens 
by governments of comparable populations‖ (Johnson et al. 2002). Because prior 
research studying the determinants of internal control weaknesses uses measures of 
financial operations for size variables (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan 
and Lilien 2005), the log of total revenues (Johnson et al. 2002; Ward et al. 1994; Copley 
1989) and total federal expenditures (Lopez and Peters 2010) are used to test the first 
hypothesis, and population is used as a sensitivity test. 
Per capita income is used to measure the wealth of a government (Langsam and 
Kreuze 1991). Education levels are correlated with wealth and knowledge (Becker and 
Chiswick 1966). Therefore, per capita income levels may indicate the education levels of 
county residents including county personnel. Per capita income information is obtained 
from either the ‗Statistical Section‘ of CAFRs or U.S. Census Bureau statistics. LN 
(INCOME) is the natural log of per capita income for 2007. 
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The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) encourages quality 
government financial reports with its annual Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in 
Financial Reporting Program (CAFR Program). Prior literature uses the award 
designation as a measure of reporting and disclosure quality (Evans and Patton 1983, 
1987; Giroux and McLelland 2003; Styles and Tennyson 2007). AWARD is an indicator 
variable that is equal to 1 if a county received a GFOA Certificate for the fiscal year 2007 
and 0 otherwise.  
Analysis of material weakness types  
The primary logistic regression model includes all material weakness disclosure 
types as the dependent variable indicating the presence of a material weakness. Using the 
results of the first paper, the material weakness sample is partitioned into the types of 
material weaknesses. Each sub-sample is used to perform logistic regression test results 
with the COSO category as the dependent variable (i.e., MW_CONENV for control 
environment, MW_RISK for risk assessment, MW_INFO for information system and 
communication, MW_CONTACT for control activities, and MW_MONITOR for 
monitoring). These tests may provide insight as to varying determinants for different 
categories of material weaknesses. The dependent variables are defined as follows: 
MW_CONENV = Material weakness in the control environment  
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
MW_RISK  = Material weakness in risk assessment (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
MW_CONACT = Material weakness in control activities (1 if yes, 0  
    otherwise) 
MW_INFO  = Material weakness in information and communication 
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 




Table 3.3 presents (untransformed) descriptive statistics for all variables in the 
logistic regression model for the full sample of material weakness counties and control 
counties. The mean total revenues and total federal expenditures are $242 million and 
$33.76 million, respectively, with medians of $51.88 million and $4.08 million, 
respectively. These ranges provide significant variation in both total revenues and federal 
awards. Counties range from having zero to 22 component units with a mean of 3.29 and 
a median of two component units. Fifty-three percent of the counties reported a material 
weakness on their financial statements.  
 














MW_MP 0 .50 0 .00 0 .50 1 .00 0.50 
TOTAL REV (millions) 242 .00 4 .46 51 .88 7,500 .00 673.00 
TOTAL FED. EXPEND.    33 .76 0 .51 4 .08 797 .00 102.00 
(millions)      
BOND 3 .03  0 .00 3 .00 12 .00 2.87 
INSUR_ONLY 0 .13 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 0.34  
UNRATED 0 .14 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 0.35  
NO_BOND_DEBT 0 .10 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 0.30  
COMPLEX 3 .29 0 .00 2 .00 22 .00 3.66  
FS_MW 0 .53 0 .00 1 .00 1 .00 0.50  
FF_CHANGE 0 .07 -0 .91 -0 .01 6 .13 0.59  
MW_PY 0 .28 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 0.45  
POPULATION 204 ,685  689 57 ,720 3,872 ,962 451,818  
INCOME 33 ,706 13 ,712 31 ,917 95 ,687 9,523  




Univariate statistics in Table 3.4 contain means for counties with material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance compared to counties matched by state 
without material weaknesses as well as the differences between the means of the two 
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groups. Chi-square test statistics indicate significant differences in frequencies between 
groups (p < 0.0001) for counties with material weaknesses on their financial statements 
and with prior year material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. As an 
unexpected result, exactly half the counties with unrated bonds appear in each group, 
therefore, there is no difference in frequencies between the two groups (p = 1.000). 
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 (t- statistic 
p-value 
bolded) 
TOTAL REV (millions) 254 .10  229 .39 0 .327 0 .744 
TOTAL FED. EXPEND. 
(millions) 
32 .05 35 .46 -0 .299 0 .765 
BOND 3 .15 2 .91 0 .741 0 .459 
INSUR_ONLY 0 .14 0 .13 0 .110 0 .741 
UNRATED 0 .14 0 .14 0 .000 1 .000 
NO_BOND_DEBT 0 .08 0 .11 0 .894 0 .345 
COMPLEX 3 .47 3 .11 0 .889 0 .375 
FS_MW 0 .73 0 .32 53 .280 <0 .0001 
FF_CHANGE 5 .01 9 .91 -0 .745 0 .457 
MW_PY 0 .50 0 .05 81 .448 <0 .0001 
POPULATION 205 ,425 203 ,945 0 .029 0 .977 
INCOME 34 ,036 33 ,376 0 .617 0 .538 
AWARD 0 .29 0 .32 0 .371 0 .543 
Observations 159 159   
 
Note: Chi-square tests are performed for dichotomous variables. All others are  
 t-tests with the results bolded. 
 
Table 3.5 presents bivariate correlation coefficients for all variables that appear in 
the model. Table 3.5a includes total revenues as the size measurement while Table 3.5b 
uses total federal expenditures as the size proxy. Most of the bivariate correlations are 
low. The highest correlation is between population with both TOTAL REV (r = 0.885) 
and TOTALFEDEXPEND (r = 0.649), two size proxies, indicating that counties with 




Table 3.5a - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models using Total Revenues as Size Proxy (n = 318) 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) MW_MP 1.000              
               
(2) TOTAL REV  0.025 1.000            
  (0.651)             
(3) BOND  0.036 0.345 1.000           
  (0.518) (0.000)            
(4) INSUR_ONLY  0.019 -0.168 -0.436 1.000          
  (0.741) (0.003) (0.000)           
(5) NO_BOND_DEBT -0.053 -0.317 -0.367 -0.128 1.000         
  (0.346) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022)          
(6) UNRATED_BND 0.000 -0.356 -0.459 -0.160 -0.135 1.000        
  (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.016)         
(7) COMPLEX  0.027 0.448 0.258 -0.024 -0.139 -0.250 1.000       
  (0.627) (0.000) (0.000) (0.668) (0.013) (0.000)        
(8) MW_FS  0.409 -0.188 -0.129 0.185 0.015 0.051 -0.096 1.000      
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.786) (0.366) (0.086)       
(9) FF_CHANGE -0.038 0.037 0.053 -0.077 0.016 0.007 0.037 -0.001 1.000     
  (0.504) (0.509) (0.347) (0.170) (0.776) (0.900) (0.506) (0.984)      
(10) MW_PY 0.506 0.020 -0.089 0.153 -0.014 -0.015 -0.029 0.321 -0.103 1.000    
  (0.000) (0.727) (0.114) (0.006) (0.808) (0.796) (0.612) (0.000) (0.068)     
(11)  POPULATION 0.011 0.885 0.278 -0.087 -0.324 -0.361 0.395 -0.183 -0.038 0.022 1.000   
  (0.849) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.498) (0.699)    
(12) INCOME -0.007 0.512 0.126 -0.187 -0.080 -0.206 0.175 -0.139 -0.047 0.014 0.427 1.000  
  (0.902) (0.000) (0.025) (0.001) (0.156) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.404) (0.804) (0.000)   
(13) AWARD -0.034 0.617 0.160 -0.137 -0.195 -0.195 0.307 -0.218 0.017 -0.074 0.576 0.292 1.000 




Table 3.5b - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models using Total Federal Expenditures for SIZE (n = 318) 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) MW_MP 1.000              
               
(2) TOT. FED. EXPD.  0.022 1.000            
  (0.699)             
(3) BOND  0.036 0.289 1.000           
  (0.518) (0.000)            
(4) INSUR_ONLY  0.019 -0.149 -0.436 1.000          
  (0.741) (0.008) (0.000)           
(5) NO_BOND_DEBT -0.053 -0.194 -0.367 -0.128 1.000         
  (0.346) (0.001) (0.000) (0.022)          
(6) UNRATED_BND 0.000 -0.300 -0.459 -0.160 -0.135 1.000        
  (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.016)         
(7) COMPLEX  0.027 0.436 0.258 -0.024 -0.139 -0.250 1.000       
  (0.627) (0.000) (0.000) (0.668) (0.013) (0.000)        
(8) MW_FS  0.409 -0.157 -0.129 0.185 0.015 0.051 -0.096 1.000      
  (0.000) (0.005) (0.021) (0.001) (0.786) (0.366) (0.086)       
(9) FF_CHANGE -0.038 0.190 0.053 -0.077 0.016 0.007 0.037 -0.001 1.000     
  (0.504) (0.001) (0.347) (0.170) (0.776) (0.900) (0.506) (0.984)      
(10) MW_PY 0.506 0.063 -0.089 0.153 -0.014 -0.015 -0.029 0.321 -0.103 1.000    
  (0.000) (0.264) (0.114) (0.006) (0.808) (0.796) (0.612) (0.000) (0.068)     
(11)  POPULATION 0.011 0.649 0.278 -0.087 -0.324 -0.361 0.395 -0.183 -0.038 0.022 1.000   
  (0.849) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.498) (0.699)    
(12) INCOME -0.007 0.368 0.126 -0.187 -0.080 -0.206 0.175 -0.139 -0.047 0.014 0.427 1.000  
  (0.902) (0.000) (0.025) (0.001) (0.156) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.404) (0.804) (0.000)   
(13) AWARD -0.034 0.482 0.160 -0.137 -0.195 -0.195 0.307 -0.218 0.017 -0.074 0.576 0.292 1.000 
  (0.544) (0.000) (0.004) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.762) (0.189) (0.000) (0.000)  
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Table 3.6 presents results of the logistic regression with MW_MP as the 
dependent variable and using the natural log of total revenues as the size proxy. In a 
logistic regression, parameter signs and p-values are used to determine the effect and 
strength of the relationship for independent variables. The pseudo R
2
 for the model 
(0.296) indicates a reasonable amount of variation left unexplained. Total federal 
expenditures measure county size in the logistic regression results in Table 3.7 with no 
real change in R
2
. Other county characteristics that may affect the presence of material 
weaknesses include knowledge and experience of grant administrators, staff size, and 
tenure of grant at county government. 
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Table 3.6 - Logistic Regression Results: Full Model using Total Revenues as SIZE 
 
MW_MP =  +  LN (TOTAL REV)  BOND +  INSUR_ONLY +  
     NO_BOND_DEBT +  UNRATED_BONDS +  COMPLEX +  
     MW_FS +  FF_CHANGE + MW_PY +  LN (POP) +  



























Intercept ? -3 .623 0 .604 -5 .887 0 .353 
SIZE: LN(TOTAL REV) (H1) - 0 .094 0 .872 0 .089 0 .878 
BOND (H2) + 0 .088 0 .393 0 .149 0 .024 
INSUR_ONLY (H2) +/- -0 .569 0 .443   
NO_BOND_DEBT (H2) - -0 .164 0 .845 0 .263 0 .675 
UNRATED_BONDS (H2) + 0 .302 0 .690 0 .716 0 .178 
COMPLEX (H3) + 0 .069 0 .103 0 .065 0 .122 
MW_FS (H4) + 1 .659 <0 .0001 1 .646 <0 .0001 
FF_CHANGE +/- -0 .046 0 .848 -0 .023 0 .922 
MW_PY + 2 .838 <0 .0001 2 .806 <0 .0001 
LN (POP) - -0 .238 0 .674 -0 .157 0 .776 
LN (INCOME) ? 0 .445 0 .782 0 .790 0 .609 
AWARD ? 0 .270 0 .495 0 .310 0 .429 
Observations    318   318 
Pseudo R
2
    .296   .295 
LR Statistic   130 .691  130 .098 




Table 3.7 - Logistic Regression Results: Full Model using Total Federal  
  Expenditures as SIZE 
 
MW_MP =  +  LN (TOTFEDEXPEND) BOND +  INSUR_ONLY +  
     NO_BOND_DEBT +  UNRATED_BONDS +  COMPLEX +  
     MW_FS +  FF_CHANGE + MW_PY +  LN (POP) +  


























Intercept ? -3 .817  0.585 -5 .978 0 .346 
SIZE: LN(TOTAL FED EXPEND)(H1) - -0 .142  0.619 -0 .156 0 .583 
BOND (H2) + 0 .098  0.345 0 .156 0 .018 
INSUR_ONLY (H2) +/- -0 .542  0.466   
NO_BOND_DEBT (H2) - -0 .108  0.897 0 .299 0 .634 
UNRATED_BONDS (H2) + 0 .334  0.659 0 .727 0 .172 
COMPLEX (H3) + 0 .076  0.079 0 .072 0 .091 
MW_FS (H4) + 1 .655 < 0.0001 1 .643 <0 .0001 
FF_CHANGE +/- -0 .021  0.931 0 .003 0 .991 
MW_PY + 2 .863 < 0.0001 2 .838 <0 .0001 
LN (POP) - -0 .072  0.857 0 .010 0 .978 
LN (INCOME) ? 0 .667  0.663 1 .004 0 .491 
AWARD ? 0 .316  0.413 0 .355 0 .351 
Observations    318   318 
Pseudo R2    .297   .296 
LR Statistic   130 .912  130 .375 
Prob (LR statistic)   <0 .0001  <0 .0001 
 
 
County size (H1) is not significant in the presence of material weaknesses. 
Counties of all sizes, as measured by either total revenues or total federal expenditures, 
have material weaknesses as indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 3.3. In the full 
models for both size proxies, financial health (H2) is not related to the internal control 
weaknesses. To further investigate this hypothesis, the counties with only insured bonds 
are eliminated from the analysis. Since counties with bond insurance receive AAA 
ratings, there is no variability within this category and a dichotomous variable is used. 
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The reduced models in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 exclude the INSUR_ONLY variable. When 
this category is omitted, BOND exhibits a significant relation (p = 0.024 and p = 0.018) 
with material weaknesses for both size proxies. As the ordinal variable increases to 
indicate lower bond ratings, the likelihood of a material weakness increases thereby 
supporting H2. 
County complexity, as measured by the number of component units, is not 
significant when county size is measured by the total revenues (Table 3.6). When total 
federal expenditures are used instead, as expected, complexity is positively related to 
material weaknesses for federal grants (Table 3.7). COMPLEX is marginally significant 
(p = 0.079) to MW_MP, thereby supporting H3. In addition, a positive significant 
relation is found between material weaknesses in financial statements and internal control 
over compliance (p < 0.0001) in all models thereby supporting H4. 
In reviewing the regression results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, it is evident that control 
variables for demographic characteristics and the GFOA award do not have significance 
to the model. Population also was examined as another proxy for county size, and 
univariate tests show no difference between counties with and without material 
weaknesses (p = 0.977). Per capita income is not significant to material weaknesses in 
internal control for federal grants. To participate in the GFOA award program, a CAFR 
must be prepared. Smaller counties do not always follow GASB 34 financial reporting 
guidelines or prepare extensive annual financial reports which are required for the GFOA 
program. Therefore, the award program may not relate to counties of all sizes as 
represented in this study. Consequently, these control variables are dropped, and a 
reduced model is used to test the hypotheses. 
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Tables 3.8a and 3.8b include Spearman correlations for the reduced models using 
total revenues and total federal expenditures, respectively, as size proxies. With the 
elimination of population statistics, all bivariate correlations are low. Table 3.9 presents 
the reduced model results using total revenues as the size proxy. Empirical results are 
relatively unchanged from the full model specifications presented in Table 3.6. When 
total federal expenditures measure county size (Table 3.10), the significance for H3 
improves slightly (p = 0.069) for complexity. By excluding the insured bonds, support is 
found for H2, H3, and H4 with no change in R
2
. Consequently, this model provides the 
best fit and is referred to subsequently as the final model.
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Table 3.8a - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Reduced Models using Total Revenues as SIZE (n = 318) 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) MW_MP 1.000           
            
(2) TOTAL REV  0.025 1.000        
  (0.651)          
(3) BOND  0.036 0.345 1.000       
  (0.518) (0.000)        
(4) NO_BOND_DEBT -0.053 -0.317 -0.367 1.000      
  (0.346) (0.000) (0.000)       
(5) UNRATED_BONDS 0.000 -0.356 -0.459 -0.135 1.000     
  (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)      
(6) COMPLEX  0.027 0.448 0.258 -0.139 -0.250 1.000    
  (0.627) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)     
(7) MW_FS  0.409 -0.188 -0.129 0.015 0.051 -0.096 1.000   
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.786) (0.366) (0.086)    
(8) FF_CHANGE -0.038 0.037 0.053 0.016 0.007 0.037 -0.001 1.000  
  (0.504) (0.509) (0.347) (0.776) (0.900) (0.506) (0.984)   
(9) MW_PY 0.506 0.020 -0.089 -0.014 -0.015 -0.029 0.321 -0.103 1.000 




Table 3.8b - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models using Total Federal Expenditures as SIZE (n = 318) 
 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) MW_MP 1.000           
            
(2) TOT. FED. EXPEND. 0.022 1.000        
  (0.699)          
(3) BOND  0.036 0.289 1.000       
  (0.518) (0.000)        
(4) NO_BOND_DEBT -0.053 -0.194 -0.367 1.000      
  (0.346) (0.001) (0.000)       
(5) UNRATED_BONDS 0.000 -0.300 -0.459 -0.135 1.000     
  (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)      
(6) COMPLEX  0.027 0.436 0.258 -0.139 -0.250 1.000    
  (0.627) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)     
(7) MW_FS  0.409 -0.157 -0.129 0.015 0.051 -0.096 1.000   
  (0.000) (0.005) (0.021) (0.786) (0.366) (0.086)    
(8) FF_CHANGE -0.038 0.190 0.053 0.016 0.007 0.037 -0.001 1.000  
  (0.504) (0.001) (0.347) (0.776) (0.900) (0.506) (0.984)   
(9) MW_PY 0.506 0.063 -0.089 -0.014 -0.015 -0.029 0.321 -0.103 1.000 





Table 3.9 – Logistic Regression Results: Reduced Model using Total Revenues as  
              SIZE 
 
 
MW_MP =  +  LN (TOTAL REV) BOND +  INSUR_ONLY +  
     NO_BOND_DEBT +  UNRATED_BONDS +  COMPLEX +  



























Intercept ? -2 .234  0.394 -3 .517  0.113 
SIZE: LN(TOTAL 
REV)(H1) 
- 0 .044  0.885 0 .164  0.551 
BOND (H2) + 0 .079  0.402 0 .142  0.026 
INSUR_ONLY (H2) +/- -0 .635  0.364   
NO_BOND_DEBT (H2) - -0 .168  0.829 0 .281  0.641 
UNRATED_BONDS (H2) + 0 .271  0.698 0 .703  0.173 
COMPLEX (H3) + 0 .069  0.101 0 .065  0.123 
MW_FS (H4) + 1 .633 < 0.0001 1 .608 < 0.0001 
FF_CHANGE +/- -0 .026  0.913 -0 .007  0.977 
MW_PY + 2 .813 < 0.0001 2 .772 < 0.0001 
Observations    318   318 
Pseudo R
2
    .295   .293 
LR Statistic   129 .955  129 .122 





Table 3.10 – Logistic Regression Results: Reduced Model using Total Federal  
 Expenditures as SIZE 
 
MW_MP =  +  LN (TOTFEDEXPEND) BOND +  INSUR_ONLY +  
 NO_BOND_DEBT  UNRATED_BONDS +  COMPLEX +  


























Intercept ? -1 .307  0.447 -2 .154  0.165 
LN(TOTFEDEXPEND)(H1) - -0 .078  0.736 -0 .010  0.966 
BOND (H2) + 0 .068  0.443 0 .138  0.030 
INSUR_ONLY (H2) +/- -0 .736  0.261   
NO_BOND_DEBT (H2) - -0 .297  0.674 0 .157  0.786 
UNRATED_BONDS (H2) + 0 .147  0.818 0 .597  0.233 
COMPLEX (H3) + 0 .077  0.069 0 .074  0.077 
MW_FS (H4) + 1 .619 < 0.0001 1 .577 < 0.0001 
FF_CHANGE +/- -0 .024  0.918 -0 .010  0.966 
MW_PY + 2 .832 < 0.0001 2 .785 < 0.0001 
Observations    318   318 
Pseudo R
2
    .295   .292 
LR Statistic   130 .049  128 .767 
Prob (LR statistic)   <0 .0001  <0 .0001 
 
 
The magnitude of the effect of the independent variables on the odds ratio (the 
ratio of the probability that a county will report a material weakness to the probability 
that a county will not report a material weakness) demonstrates the effect of the binary 
dependent variable increasing from a value of 0 to a value of 1. The odds ratios for LN 
(TOTALFEDEXPEND) and COMPLEX are 0.990 and 1.077, respectively. An odds 
ratios equal or close to 1 means there is an equal chance that a material weakness will or 
will not be reported with a small change in the independent variables. For the financial 
health variables, some variation is observed. Odds ratios for counties with unrated bonds 




(1.170). Prior research finds that counties with unrated bonds are less financially stable 
than counties with bond ratings (Allen et al. 2009). Consequently, the odds ratio indicates 
that counties with unrated bonds are almost twice as likely to report a material weakness. 
The odds ratio for counties with material weaknesses on their financial statements is 
4.480, thereby adding further support for the high significance levels reported in 
regression results for counties with material weaknesses in internal control over 
compliance. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The final model is tested using probit regression, and the results for hypotheses 
conclusions are the same as those reported under the logistic regression model, thereby 
indicating no variations between model specifications. Next, variables are estimated with 
different specifications to test the robustness of the results. While county size is analyzed 
already using two proxies, the difference in empirical results from private sector 
companies invites further investigation. First, SIZE is measured as the natural log of 2007 
population statistics. Governmental research uses population as a proxy for size (Styles 
and Tennyson 2007; Gore 2004; McLelland and Giroux 2000; Copley 1991; Ingram 
1984). Using the final model, statistical results match those using total federal 
expenditures as the SIZE proxy. Empirical results support H2 (p = 0.028),  
H3 (p = 0.088), and H4 (p < 0.0001). Next, the natural log of total assets is used to proxy 
for SIZE. H2 regarding financial health (p = 0.026) and H4 relating to financial statement 
material weaknesses (p < 0.0001) are both supported. H3, however, which measures the 




used for county size, empirical results do not indicate that county size is a determinant for 
material weaknesses for federal grants. 
Earlier models omitted the population variable that showed a correlation to total 
federal expenditures. To retain the population size variable along with total federal 
expenditures in the final model, a two-stage regression model includes the correlated 
continuous variables using the residuals from the first stage results. Two-stage regression 
results indicate no difference in significant variables. Support is found for H2, H3, and 
H4, thereby adding to the evidence that size is not a factor influencing the reporting of a 
material weakness in internal control over compliance. 
Material weakness type analysis 
While analyses have been planned to evaluate determinants for each COSO 
internal control category of weaknesses, available sample sizes limit potential 
approaches. Matched sample sizes for control environment (n = 64), risk assessment  
(n = 12), and monitoring (n = 70) provide insufficient degrees of freedom to conduct 
logistic regression tests with the number of variables in the final model. First, counties 
with material weaknesses under control activities are tested with the logistic regression 
model. With 306 observations, this sample encompasses most of the full sample (n = 
318), and empirical results include support for H2, H3, and H4 (Table 3.11).  
The data subset for counties with material weaknesses in information and 
communication (n = 160) yields unexpected results. Unlike the full sample results, this 
subset finds that counties with no bond debt are more likely to have material weaknesses 
for federal grants (p = 0.068), and underlying bond ratings, BOND, are not significant. 




counties either fund their operations with current revenues or finance buildings and 
equipment with capital leases. When sub-categories of counties with no long-term debt 
and those that use capital lease financing replace the NO_BOND_DEBT variable, 
empirical results find that counties with capital leases (p = 0.039) are more likely to have 
material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. H3 which hypothesizes that 
complex counties, as measured by the number of component units are related to material 
weaknesses, is supported with p-value of 0.005. H4 also is supported, and the model has 
an R
2
 of 0.449. Mean federal expenditures for counties with material weaknesses in this 
subset are $51 million, a higher amount than the $32 million mean for the overall sample 





Table 3.11 – Logistic Regression Results: Reduced Model for COSO categories 
 
MW_CONACT =  +  LN (TOTFEDEXPEND) BOND +  
 NO_BOND_DEBT +  UNRATED_BONDS +  
 COMPLEX +  MW_FS +  FF_CHANGE +  
MW_PY + 

MW_INFO =  +  LN (TOTFEDEXPEND) BOND +  
 NO_BOND_DEBT +  UNRATED_BONDS +  


























Intercept ? -2 .349  0.139 -2 .628  0.281 
LN(TOTFEDEXPEND)(H1) - 0 .009  0.969 -0 .097  0.776 
BOND (H2) + 0 .149  0.023 0 .110  0.309 
NO_BOND_DEBT (H2) - 0 .231  0.695 1 .832  0.068 
UNRATED_BONDS (H2) + 0 .701  0.177 -0 .093  0.927 
COMPLEX (H3) + 0 .074  0.079 0 .196  0.005 
MW_FS (H4) + 1 .588 < 0.0001 1 .898  0.0002 
FF_CHANGE +/- -0 .089  0.772 -0 .089  0.865 
MW_PY + 2 .777 < 0.0001 4 .486 < 0.0001 
Observations    306   160 
Pseudo R
2
    .291   .449 
LR Statistic   123 .452  221 .807 





3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Prior research evaluates determinants of material weaknesses in internal control 
over financial reporting under the SEC environment (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 
2005; Bryan and Lilien 2005), but no study examines determinants for material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance. A sample of 318 U.S. counties (general 
purpose) in fiscal year 2007 is used to investigate whether a reported material weakness 
in internal control over compliance for federal grants is associated with (1) size;  
(2) financial health; (3); complex operations; and (4) a material weakness in the financial 
statements. 
This exploratory study provides new evidence about federal grant administration 
and finds both similarities and differences between material weaknesses for private and 
public entities. Like private company counterparts, counties with complex operations and 
poor financial health are more likely to report material weaknesses (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge 
and McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 2005). This study also finds that counties with 
material weaknesses in the financial statements are more likely to have material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance. Unlike private companies, however, 
county size is not a determinant for federal grant internal control weaknesses. Since 
individual county departments tend to administer federal grant programs, the overall 
county size may not be a factor. Empirical results add to internal control literature 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 
2005) for internal control weakness disclosures applied to both federal grants and a local 




A potential limitation of this study is the time frame which covers a single year. 
Future research beyond the scope of this study can determine if similar patterns would be 
present over a longer time period. Unlike SOX Section 404‘s criminal penalties for non-
disclosure of material weaknesses in internal controls, federal guidelines do not outline 
penalties for non-disclosure of material weaknesses in compliance. Consequently, 
another limitation of this study is that there may be instances where material weaknesses 
in internal control over compliance were present but were unreported. The variations in 
regression models make the study results vulnerable to Type I errors (Basu et al. 2010). 
Full and reduced models as well as p-value results are disclosed for variations. 
The study finds that the GFOA award program is not significant to the reporting 
of material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. Because prior research 
proxies the award with quality financial reporting (Evans and Patton 1983, 1987; Giroux 
and McLelland 2003; Styles and Tennyson 2007), the insignificance is relevant. The 
mean federal expenditures for award recipients approximate $84 million with 46 of 97 
award recipients reporting material weaknesses. Though participating counties are 
generally larger in size, the study finds that size is not a determinant for material 
weaknesses. The unexplained significance for this variable could indicate unidentified 
omitted variables, and additional research could focus on whether the GFOA program 
influences quality reporting. 
Because the study results pertain to one type of governmental unit (counties), 
generalizability of the results to other entity types may be limited. Future research could 
study determinants for municipalities, colleges and universities, or not-for-profit 




counties in the study report material weaknesses over the financial statements. Future 
research could investigate the determinants of financial statement material weaknesses 






Characteristics of Auditors Reporting Material Weaknesses in Internal Control 
over Compliance for Federal Grants 
 
Abstract:  
This paper investigates auditor characteristics associated with the disclosure of a 
material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular 
A-133 for 4,560 U.S. counties during 2006-2008. Using a logistic regression, hypotheses 
are tested related to whether a reported material weakness in internal control for federal 
grants is associated with the following auditor characteristics: (1) PCAOB firm 
registration, (2) voluntary membership with the AICPA‘s Governmental Audit Quality 
Center, (3) the disclosure of a material weakness on the related financial statements, and 
(4) initial-year audits. Empirical results indicate that auditors who report material 
weaknesses in county financial statements are likely to report material weaknesses in 
internal control over compliance. Material weaknesses identified in single audits are more 
likely to be reported first-year auditors. Voluntary membership with the AICPA‘s 
Government Audit Quality Center is negatively related to reported material weaknesses 
for counties with total federal expenditures exceeding $10 million, and PCAOB 
membership is not a significant factor. The results of this study could influence counties‘ 
auditor selection decisions and stimulate discussions for oversight agencies to the 
desirability of required audit firm rotations. Future research could test the effects in other 





 This paper examines auditor characteristics associated with reporting material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance for federal grants. A material weakness is 
―a significant deficiency,
1
 or combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more 
than a remote likelihood that material noncompliance with a type of compliance 
requirement of a federal program will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal 
control‖ (AICPA 2008a, 247).
2
 A sample of 4,560 U.S. counties including 459 that 
disclosed at least one material weakness in internal control over compliance and 4,101 
that did not is used to investigate whether auditor characteristics influence whether a 
material weakness is reported. 
 Historically, counties are extensions of state governments and provide services 
more easily administered at a local level. Over time, counties have expanded their range 
of services. Counties administer federal grants for a broad spectrum of programs 
including school systems, public safety, highway and road projects, and community 
development programs. Such program activities lead to different types of federal grants 
audited and reported on each year and cover a wide variety of federal grantor agencies. 
Consequently, there are many federal programs with audits of internal control over 
compliance in which material weaknesses are discovered. This contrasts with colleges 
and universities, hospitals, or housing authorities where a smaller number of grants are 
                                                          
1
 A significant deficiency is ―a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that adversely 
affects the entity‘s ability to administer a federal program such that there is more than a remote likelihood 
that noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program that is more than 
inconsequential will not be prevented or detected by the entity‘s internal control‖ (AICPA 2008a, 247). 
 
2
 Subsequent to the study‘s sample period, the definition of material weakness was revised. Issued in 
December 2009, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 117, ―Compliance Audits,‖ defines a material 
weakness in internal control over compliance as ―a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in internal 
control over compliance, such that there is a reasonable possibility that material noncompliance with a 




limited to a single federal grantor agency. With annual single audit requirements for 
counties with federal expenditures exceeding $500,000 (OMB 2003), an understanding of 
the auditors who report internal control weaknesses is helpful to county administrators 
and commissioners, federal and state grantor agencies, and even auditors. The factors 
may influence a county‘s selection of auditors. In addition, knowledge related to auditors 
who report material weaknesses would help grantor agencies better evaluate audit results. 
State audit offices and private audit firms could provide adequate training for their staff 
and market their qualifications in recruiting clients. With the U.S. budgeting over $652 
billion in federal grants to state and local governments for fiscal year 2010 (OMB 2010), 
audit findings related to federal grants is an important area. 
 Using a sample of 459 U.S. counties that disclosed at least one material 
weakness in internal control over compliance in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, and 
4,101 that did not, this study investigates whether the auditor reporting a material 
weakness in internal control over compliance for federal grants is associated with the 
following characteristics: (1) CPA firm registration with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB); (2) voluntary membership in the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants‘ (AICPA) Governmental Audit Quality Center;  
(3) a reported material weakness on the financial statements of the county; and (4) an 
initial-year audit.  
 A logistic regression model is used to test several hypotheses. Primary findings 
include that material weaknesses in financial statements are significantly positively 
related to material weaknesses in internal control over compliance and that initial-year 




expenditures exceeding $10 million, membership in the AICPA‘s Government Audit 
Quality Center is negatively related to the likelihood of reporting of material weaknesses. 
Finally, no relation is found between audit firm registrations with the PCAOB and the 
reporting of material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. 
 Auditors of federal grants have been required to report material weaknesses in 
internal control over compliance since the Single Audit Act of 1984 (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2002; 1984). Prior research on material weaknesses related to internal 
controls has focused on publicly held corporations (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle 
et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005), but research addressing internal control over 
compliance for federal programs is limited (Lopez and Peters 2010; Jakubowski 1995). 
Lopez and Peters (2010) find an association between audit quality and larger CPA firms 
for compliance audits. Their research investigating material weaknesses in internal 
control over compliance, however, does not study auditor characteristics other than audit 
firm size and auditor type. Using the reporting of material weaknesses as a proxy for 
audit quality, this study explores specific auditor characteristics related to professional 
memberships, detections of financial statement material weaknesses, and auditor changes 
to determine whether they are the extenuating factors behind existing conclusions about 
audit quality for compliance audits. Different from Lopez and Peters (2010), this study 
includes a control variable for the client risk factor associated with auditors of federal 
grants. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section 
provides background information on single audit legislation and auditor requirements. 




section provides the research methodology and information relating to the sample 
selection. The sixth section reports the empirical results and a discussion of results. The 
final section includes the summary and concluding comments. 
4.2 Background 
Single Audit: Institutional Background 
A single audit has two main objectives. First, auditors perform an audit of the 
entity‘s financial statements and report on the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal 
Awards in relation to those financial statements. Second, auditors complete a compliance 
audit of federal awards expended during the fiscal year. Accordingly, ―the auditor has 
additional testing and reporting responsibilities for compliance, as well as internal control 
over compliance, beyond a financial statement audit performed in accordance with 
Government Auditing Standards and generally accepted auditing standards‖ (AICPA 
2004). 
The Single Audit Act of 1984 (SAA) established uniform audit requirements for 
state and local governments receiving federal financial assistance. Federal assistance, also 
known as federal awards, includes ―grants, loans, loan guarantees, property (including 
donated surplus property), cooperative agreements, interest subsidies, insurance, food 
commodities, direct appropriations, and other assistance‖ (OMB 2003, Subpart A). The 
single audit approach covers both the financial statement and compliance audits and was 
intended to meet audit requirements for all federal agencies awarding financial assistance 
(Single Audit Library 2010). The director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) was given the responsibility to prescribe policies, procedures, and guidelines to 




Governments (OMB 1985), and in 1990 issued Circular A-133, Audits of Institutions of 
Higher Education and Other Nonprofit Institutions (OMB 1990) to assist auditors. Single 
audits can be performed by an independent certified public accountant (CPA) or by a 
state or local government auditor that acts as an external auditor. 
Under the SAA, state and local governments that received at least $100,000 in 
federal financial assistance in a fiscal year were required to have a single audit. 
Organizations receiving federal awards between $25,000 and $100,000 had the option of 
a single audit or compliance with the grantor agency‘s alternate audit requirements (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1984).  
 The initial SAA was rescinded with the passage of the Single Audit Act 
Amendments of 1996. The new law raised the audit threshold from federal receipts over 
$25,000 to federal expenditures exceeding $300,000 (U.S. House of Representatives 
1996). The increased dollar threshold relieved the audit burden for entities receiving 
smaller federal awards and required single audits for all grant recipients exceeding the 
threshold (Foelster and Scott 1998). In 1997, the OMB rescinded Circular A-128, which 
related to state and local governments, and re-issued OMB Circular A-133, re-titled 
Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations, to apply to both 
government and nonprofit entities. This Circular was issued pursuant to the SAA of 1984 
and the amendments in 1996. A goal of Circular A-133 was to set forth uniform audit 
standards for all recipients of federal awards including, states, local governments, and 
nonprofit organizations beginning with fiscal years ending June 30, 1997. A revision in 




Single Audit Procedures 
 The provisions of OMB Circular A-133 include new methods to determine which 
federal programs are audited as major programs. Prior to the revised Circular, all 
programs with expenditures exceeding $300,000 were audited as major programs. The 
new provisions outline a risk-based selection of major programs where auditors first 
divide programs by their federal expenditure amounts with a dollar threshold level to 
separate grant programs into Type A and Type B programs. For entities with up to $100 
million in total federal expenditures, the dollar threshold is the larger of $300,000 or three 
percent of total federal expenditures. For entities with total federal expenditure amounts 
exceeding $100 million, various percentages of total awards are scaled for total 
expenditure amounts to determine the threshold. All programs with federal expenditures 
exceeding the threshold are considered Type A; the programs under the threshold are 
considered Type B.  
Once Type A and B programs are identified, auditors perform risk assessments of 
federal programs and classify them as high- or low-risk programs. Due to the dollar 
amounts involved, emphasis initially is placed on Type A programs. By default, Type A 
programs are high risk, but they can be classified as low-risk if they have been audited in 
the two most recent audit periods with no negative audit findings. Next, Type B programs 
are evaluated for high-risk status (OMB 2003). Risk factors include a new grant, prior 
findings, client concerns, or a designation by the grantor agency. All high-risk Type A 
programs are audited as major programs. In addition, either half of all high-risk Type B 
programs or a substitution of one high-risk Type B program for each low-risk Type A 




determine which federal programs are audited as major programs with an emphasis 
toward risk-based audits. 
Auditors select a combination of federal programs to be audited as major 
programs so that 50 percent of total federal expenditures are audited. If an entity qualifies 
as a low-risk auditee, however, this amount is reduced to 25 percent of total federal 
expenditures. To qualify as a low-risk auditee, the entity must meet the following 
conditions for the previous two audit periods: unqualified opinions on the financial 
statements and schedule of federal expenditures; generally, no material weaknesses in 
internal control over financial reporting in accordance with Government Auditing 
Standards; and no material weaknesses in internal controls, material noncompliance, or 
questioned costs exceeding five percent in Type A programs (OMB 2003).  
Auditors of non-governmental entity financial statements consider the internal 
control over financial reporting as required by generally accepted auditing standards. 
Auditors of governmental entities assess internal control with regard to generally 
accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS or ―Yellow Book‖). As an additional 
step, auditors performing single audits for governmental entities obtain an understanding 
of internal control regarding compliance requirements under OMB Circular A-133 for 
each major program. Compliance requirements are outlined in 14 categories as shown in 
Figure 4.1. Auditors assess control risk and perform tests of internal controls over major 
programs. OMB Circular A-133 requires auditors to plan the audit to support a low 
assessed level of control risk. Negative audit findings, known as significant deficiencies,
3
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if any, are reported, and a determination is made as to whether significant deficiencies are 
elevated to material weaknesses. 
 
(a) Activities allowed or unallowed  
(b) Allowable costs/cost principles  
(c) Cash management  
(d) Davis-Bacon Act (related to construction projects funded by federal grants)  
(e) Eligibility  
(f) Equipment and real property management  
(g) Matching, level of effort, earmarking  
(h) Period of availability of Federal funds  
(i) Procurement and suspension and debarment (of contractors paid from federal  
 funds)  
(j) Program income  
(k) Real property acquisition and relocation assistance  
(l) Reporting  
(m) Subrecipient monitoring  
(n) Special tests and provisions  
 
Figure 4.1 – 14 Compliance Requirements of OMB Circular A-133  
Source: OMB 2003, Subpart E  
 
Each year an updated Compliance Supplement is issued to provide audit guidance 
to specific federal programs. That is, specific compliance requirements for different 
federal programs are revised and added each year with the goal of an eventual updated 
compliance program for each federal award program. In a compliance audit, auditors 
must document and perform tests of the grant‘s specific compliance requirements.  
Audit reports required by OMB Circular A-133 include an opinion covering the financial 




requirements applicable to major programs and internal control over compliance in 
accordance with OMB Circular A-133.
4
 Auditors also prepare a Schedule of Findings and 
Questioned Costs to summarize the audit results. In addition, OMB Circular A-133 
increases the reporting requirements with the Data Collection Form to be submitted to the 
Federal Audit Clearinghouse. This electronic submission includes information such as 
auditor name, the types of opinions issued, a listing of all federal awards as well as the 
identification of major programs, audit findings, and the presence of material weaknesses. 
With the implementation of the revised OMB Circular A-133, the single audit 
environment changed, thereby raising auditor responsibilities in performing a proper 
audit.  
Audit Quality  
 Single audit quality was studied by the President‘s Council on Integrity and 
Effectiveness (PCIE) in the National Single Audit Sampling Project with its report issued 
in June 2007. In collaboration with various federal and state agencies, the PCIE‘s 
objective was to assess the quality of single audits and to make recommendations to 
address noted audit quality issues. To address deficiencies noted in single audits, a three-
pronged approach was recommended to the OMB which also could work with parties like 
the AIPCA and the PCIE. The first recommendation was to revise and improve single 
audit standards, criteria, and guidance. Second, the OMB should establish minimum 
training requirements for auditors who perform single audits. The third recommendation 
was to review and enhance processes to address unacceptable single audits (PCIE 2007). 
Because of the PCIE report recommendations, much focus has been placed on single 
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 Aside from Circular A-133, Government Auditing Standards requires an opinion on internal control over 




audits. Audit findings are important as they highlight current issues in grant 
administration and can point grantor agencies to greater areas of concern. Moreover, 
audit findings depend on quality audits. Grantor agencies use single audit reports to 
assess grantee compliance and sometimes perform their own program audits to 
investigate deeper issues. 
 In 2009 the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 117, ―Compliance Audits‖ (AICPA 2009c) 
to supersede Statement on Auditing Standards No. 74, ―Compliance Auditing 
Considerations in Audits of Governmental Entities and Recipients of Governmental 
Financial Assistance,‖ (AICPA 1995). SAS No. 117 reflects subsequent changes to 
Government Auditing Standards, the Single Audit Act, and OMB Circular A-133 and has 
an implementation date for fiscal periods ending on or after June 1, 2010 (AICPA 2009c).  
4.3 Prior Research  
 In the non-governmental public sector, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) has brought greater emphasis to internal controls over financial reporting. 
Researchers have examined the determinants of material weaknesses (Doyle et al. 2007) 
and descriptions of various types of material weaknesses identified by publicly-traded 
companies (Ge and McVay 2005). While research in the private sector on material 
weaknesses has increased with the focus on SOX (Hoitash et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2008; 
Hermanson et al. 2008), single audit research, in general, is sparse. Prior single audit 
research largely focuses on audit quality and does not cover sample periods after 
amendments to the Single Audit Act of 1984 (Colbert and Murray 1998; Copley and 




 Jakubowski (1995) examines material internal control weaknesses in federal 
programs reported for counties and municipalities in the four-year period following the 
passage of the Single Audit Act of 1984. He finds that auditors report more control 
weaknesses for counties than for cities and that the number of weaknesses reported for 
cities decline in the time period but remain fairly constant for counties. The higher 
number of reported weaknesses in counties makes a sample of counties a rich area for 
examination. In addition, Jakubowski (1995) finds that government auditors report more 
material internal control weaknesses than both large and small CPA firms. 
 Using a sample subject to the revised audit provisions of Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-133, issued in 1997, Lopez and Peters (2010) investigate 
material weakness disclosures for single audits. They also examine reporting differences 
between governmental auditors and CPA firms. Contrary to prior literature (Brown and 
Raghunandan 1995; Jakubowski 1995), Lopez and Peters (2010) find that CPA firms are 
more likely to report material weaknesses than government auditors. To further 
investigate their unexpected result, this study examines specific auditor characteristics 
and audit quality. This study is the first to look at specific auditor traits associated with a 
material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular 
A-133 for counties. 
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the ability of an auditor to discover a 
breach in a client‘s accounting system and the auditor‘s willingness to report the breach. 
Audit quality research rests on the idea that differences in audit quality are found in 




surrogates for audit quality used in prior research indicate that higher audit quality is 
associated with larger CPA firms (DeFond 1992; Krishnan and Schauer 2000; Geiger and 
Rama 2006). This finding holds for governmental settings as well (O‘Keefe et al. 1994; 
Colbert and O‘Keefe 1995). Using reported audit findings as a proxy for audit quality, 
Lopez and Peters (2010) investigate the association between auditor type and the 
disclosure of internal control deficiencies resulting from single audits for counties and 
municipalities. In contrast to prior literature (Brown and Raghunandan 1995; Jakubowski 
1995), Lopez and Peters find that CPA firms are more likely than governmental auditors 
to disclose deficiencies in internal control over compliance for OMB Circular A-133 
audits. In addition, their empirical results show that larger CPA firms report more internal 
control findings than smaller audit firms.  
While an association between audit quality and audit firm size has been found, 
varying reasons explain the connection. DeAngelo (1981) argues that individual clients 
make up smaller portions of large firm revenues and increase independence, and that 
large firms protect their reputations by performing quality work. Alternately, Khurana 
and Raman (2004) find that litigation exposure concerns, not protection of brand 
reputation, drive perceived audit quality for Big Four
5
 firms. A possible interpretation of 
the literature is that small audit firms produce lower quality audits (DeFond and Francis 
2005). Yet another explanation is that high-quality companies hire high-quality auditors 
thereby making auditor choice endogenous (Francis 2004). 
While there are alternative explanations for the association between audit quality 
and audit firm size, the driving factors of this finding are still unknown (Francis 2004). 
While Lopez and Peters (2010) show audit quality is associated with larger audit firms 
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for compliance audits, their research does not control for other auditor characteristics. 
This study explores specific factors that may be associated with audit quality and looks at 
auditor traits as described in the following hypotheses. 
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), audit firms of 
publicly-held clients are required to register with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). Firm membership requirements include continuing 
professional education of audit firm personnel, a system of quality control for a CPA 
firm‘s accounting and auditing practice, and monitoring of a firm‘s accounting and 
auditing practice (PCAOB 2010a). Registered firms also are subject to inspections by the 
PCAOB to assess compliance with the SOX, PCAOB rules, SEC rules, and professional 
standards (PCAOB 2010b). Moreover, experience in detecting material weaknesses under 
SOX Section 404 requirements may make auditors more likely to detect material 
weaknesses under OMB Circular A-133. Read et al. (2004) find that audit firm 
registration with the PCAOB signals audit quality to existing and potential clients and, 
more importantly, that some local and regional audit firms without publicly-held audit 
clients have voluntarily registered. Since county audits are performed largely by local and 
regional audit firms that may or may not have audit clients subject to the PCAOB, 
registration is relevant. Given this association, this study tests whether PCAOB 
registration impacts surrogate measures for audit quality for auditors of federal grants. 
The first hypothesis, stated in alternate form, is as follows. 
H1: A material weakness in internal control over compliance is more likely to be 
reported if the audit firm is registered with the PCAOB. 
 
 The AICPA has established the Governmental Audit Quality Center (GAQC) to 




about the latest developments in accounting and auditing for governmental entities, 
information about changing rules and regulations, and news alerts and webcasts on 
current issues. Voluntary membership by public accounting firms and state auditors 
allows access to resources to enhance audit quality. The AICPA discloses member firms, 
thus allowing governmental entities to identify audit firms committed to governmental 
audit quality. Firm membership requires an audit partner to be responsible for the quality 
of the firm‘s governmental audit practice and includes requirements for continuing 
professional education and firm internal inspections (AICPA 2009d). Therefore, GAQC 
members may be better equipped to identify material weaknesses in internal controls over 
compliance. The next hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H2: A material weakness in internal control over compliance is more likely to be 
reported if the auditor is a member of the AICPA Governmental Audit Quality 
Center. 
 
Following DeAngelo‘s (1981) definition of audit quality, if an auditor detects and 
reports a material weakness related to the financial statements, it is likely that the auditor 
also would be able to detect, and subsequently report, a material weakness over 
compliance. The disclosure of a material weakness is viewed unfavorably by clients and 
can influence the type of audit opinion issued. Reported material weaknesses alert federal 
and state oversight agencies about concerns in county administration and may invite a 
monitoring visit or additional administrative procedures. Consequently, auditors must 
resist acquiescing to client pressures to minimize internal control weaknesses. 
Single audits require audit procedures over both the financial statements and 
federal grant programs. The additional auditing procedures may highlight internal control 




be an indicator that a material weakness in compliance over grants also may be present. 
Auditors who detect and report a material weakness over the financial statements in spite 
of the possible negative effects to the client would report another type of material 
weakness. Consequently, the next hypothesis predicts that a material weakness in internal 
controls over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular A-133 is more likely when a 
material weakness in the financial statements is reported. The third hypothesis, stated in 
alternate form, is as follows. 
H3: A material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 is more likely to be reported when the auditor reports a 
material weakness in regard to the financial statements. 
 
Prior research on the effect of auditor tenure yields mixed results. Some extant 
research provides evidence of a positive relation between auditor tenure and audit quality 
(Carcello and Nagy 2004; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Ghosh and Moon 2005; Knapp 
1991; Manry et al. 2008). Johnson et al. (2002) find that short audit tenure results in 
lower financial reporting quality and long audit tenure shows no reduction in reporting 
quality. New auditors are less familiar with the client and its industry than auditors with 
long tenure (Carcello and Nagy 2004). 
Another stream of research shows that longer auditor tenure results in more 
substandard audits (Deis and Giroux 1992; Copley and Doucet 1993b) indicating that 
auditors may become complacent over time (Shockley 1982). First-year auditors avoid 
issues such as complacency and opportunistic behavior associated with longer audit 
tenure (DeAngelo 1981; Shockley 1982; Deis and Giroux 1992; Copley and Doucet 
1993b). Consequently, a new auditor may be more objective in determining internal 




Zhang et al. (2007) find a higher likelihood of internal control deficiencies. In addition, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find a positive relation between auditor resignations and 
reported internal control deficiencies for publicly-traded companies. In contrast to the 
body of extant literature with mixed empirical results for auditor tenure and audit quality, 
internal control weakness literature supports a positive relation between auditor changes 
and the presence of an internal control weakness, therefore, the fourth hypothesis stated 
in alternate form posits that first-year auditors will be more likely to disclose a material 
weakness. 
H4: A material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with 
OMB Circular A-133 is more likely to be reported by first-year auditors than 
continuing auditors. 
 
4.5 Methodology  
Sample Selection 
The Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC) of the U.S. Census Bureau maintains a 
publicly available single audit database (http://harvester.census.gov/sac/) with auditor and 
auditee information for federal grant audits. General purpose
6
 counties are used as the 
setting to test the hypotheses. Counties administer federal grants for a broad spectrum of 
programs including school systems, public safety, highway and road projects, and 
community development programs. Counties provide a suitable setting as their varied 
program activities lead to different types of federal grants audited and cover a wide 
spectrum of federal grantor agencies.  
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 According to Wilson et al. (2007, 2), general purpose governments ―provide many categories of services 
to their residents (such as police and fire protection, sanitation, construction and maintenance of streets, 





The sample period is fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008. This time frame includes 
the implementation of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 112,
7
 
―Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified in an Audit,‖ which 
provides updated guidance for financial statement audits. The OMB amended Circular A-
133 with SAS No. 112 internal control terminology effective for single audits of periods 
ending on or after December 15, 2006 (AICPA 2008b). With county fiscal year-end dates 
throughout the calendar year, the sample period includes the implementation year as well 
as the prior and following years. A control variable indicates any temporal differences in 
years. 
General purpose counties with single audits in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, 
are identified yielding 5,047 observations with completed records in the FAC. See Table 
1 for detailed statistics on observations. Observations for consolidated city-county 
governments (14), repeated entities (3), and insufficient prior year information to 
determine initial-year auditor status (470) are removed from the sample. Three extreme 
outliers are identified, but as sensitivity tests below describe, they do not affect the 
study‘s results and remain in the sample. The resulting sample contains 4,560 counties 
reporting 459 material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. As shown in 
Table 4.1, the sample is evenly distributed across the fiscal years in the study. Table 4.2 
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Table 4.1 – Summary of Sample Observations 
 2006 2007 2008 Total 
     
General-purpose counties 1,787 1,659 1,601 5,047 
Less: Consolidated city-county governments (    5) (    5) (    4) (  14) 
Less: Repeated items (    1) (    1) (    1) (    3) 
Less: Insufficient information to determine     
          initial-year audit variable (226) (119) (125) (470) 
     
Sample 1,555 1,534 1,471 4,560 
     





Table 4.2 – Distribution of Sample Observations by State and Year 
 
     % of  
State 2006 2007 2008 Total  Total 
      
Alabama 59 43 38 140 3.1% 
Alaska 8 8 8 24 0.5% 
Arizona 12 13 10 35 0.8% 
Arkansas 8 10 8 26 0.6% 
California 56 55 56 167 3.7% 
Colorado 50 51 50 151 3.3% 
Delaware 3 3 3 9 0.2% 
Florida 59 57 58 174 3.8% 
Georgia 35 34 36 105 2.3% 
Hawaii 3 3 3 9 0.2% 
Idaho 13 14 9 36 0.8% 
Illinois 57 58 49 164 3.6% 
Indiana 54 54 32 140 3.1% 
Iowa 38 33 40 111 2.4% 
Kansas 15 17 18 50 1.1% 
Kentucky 8 4 7 19 0.4% 
Louisiana 29 29 30 88 1.9% 
Maine 5 5 4 14 0.3% 
Maryland 24 23 21 68 1.5% 
Massachusetts 3 3 2 8 0.2% 
Michigan 59 61 61 181 4.0% 
Minnesota 69 72 78 219 4.8% 
Mississippi 37 44 30 111 2.4% 
Missouri 24 19 18 61 1.3% 
Montana 19 19 17 55 1.2% 
Nebraska 11 8 6 25 0.5% 
Nevada 13 12 12 37 0.8% 
New Hampshire 1 1 1 3 0.1% 
New Jersey 20 17 20 57 1.3% 
New Mexico 11 11 14 36 0.8% 
New York 57 57 57 171 3.8% 
North Carolina 81 84 79 244 5.4% 
North Dakota 15 12 12 39 0.9% 
Ohio 79 82 75 236 5.2% 
Oklahoma 4 3 2 9 0.2% 
Oregon 32 35 34 101 2.2% 
Pennsylvania 63 62 58 183 4.0% 
South Carolina 29 29 28 86 1.9% 
South Dakota 4 2 5 11 0.2% 
Tennessee 90 86 90 266 5.8% 
Texas 62 60 55 177 3.9% 
Utah 14 14 12 40 0.9% 
Virginia 87 88 92 267 5.9% 
Washington 36 36 32 104 2.3% 
West Virginia 10 13 12 35 0.8% 
Wisconsin 71 72 72 215 4.7% 
Wyoming 18 18 17 53 1.2% 






Following prior research (Lopez and Peters 2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; 
Doyle et al. 2007), a logistic regression framework is used to model the probability that a 
material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB Circular 
A-133 is disclosed. The regression model is used to estimate the coefficients and 
statistical significance of each variable and is given below.  
MW_MP =  + PCAOB + GAQC + FS_MW + INITIAL_AUDIT  
   + GOVT + HIGH_RISK +LN (TOTAL FED_EXPEND)  
   +LN (CLIENTS) +RISK_PORTFOLIO + MW_PY 
 + YEARk +

Where: 
MW_MP   = Material weakness in internal control over  
     compliance in accordance with OMB Circular  
A-133 disclosed (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
PCAOB   = Audit firm registered with the PCAOB  
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
GAQC   = Auditor membership with the AICPA  
     Governmental  Audit Quality Center  
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
FS_MW   = Material weakness on the financial statements  
     disclosed (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
INITIAL_AUDIT  = Initial-year audit by auditor in sample year  
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
GOVT   = Audit performed by state or local government  
     auditor (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
HIGH_RISK   = County was not designated a low-risk auditee  
(0 if a low-risk auditee, 1 otherwise); 
LN (TOTAL FED_EXPEND) = Natural log of dollar amount of total federal  
     expenditures 
LN (CLIENTS)  = Natural log of number of county audit clients by  
     auditor each year 
RISK_PORTFOLIO = Average score of high-risk county auditees,  
     calculated for each auditor each year 
MW_PY   = Material weakness in internal control reported in the  
     prior year (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
YEARk   = Indicator variable (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) to identify  
     audit fiscal year (2007, 2008) 





The dependent variable in the logistic regression, MW_MP, is the presence of a 
reported material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB 
Circular A-133 and is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the entity discloses a material 
weakness for a major program in the report on internal control over compliance in 
accordance with OMB Circular A-133, and 0 otherwise. This information is obtained 
from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC) single audit database.  
Test Variables 
H1 is tested by the dichotomous variable, PCAOB, coded as 1 if the audit firm is 
registered with the PCAOB, and 0 otherwise. PCAOB registration status is obtained from 
a list of registered firms on the PCAOB web site (http://www.pcaob.com/Registration/). 
Because registered firms meet specified audit quality standards, a positive relation is 
expected between PCAOB registration and the reporting of a material weakness in 
internal control over compliance.  
H2 is tested by the dichotomous variable, GAQC, coded as 1 if the auditor is a 
member of the AICPA Government Audit Quality Center, and 0 otherwise. Because 
voluntary membership could indicate a commitment to quality governmental audits, a 
positive association is expected between GAQC membership and an auditor‘s reporting 
of a material weakness over compliance. Auditor membership is found on a listing of 
member firms and government auditors from the GAQC web site 
(http://gaqc.aicpa.org/Memberships/). 
If a significant deficiency on the financial statements is disclosed, auditors make a 
determination as to whether it is a material weakness. H3 correlates the disclosure of a 




controls over compliance of major programs. FS_MW is an indicator variable coded as 1 
if a material weakness is disclosed in regard to financial reporting and 0 otherwise. This 
information is obtained from the FAC database. It is hypothesized that there will be a 
positive relation between FS_MW and MW_MP.  
H4 posits that a material weakness is more likely to be reported by first-time 
auditors. Because Zhang et al. (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find auditor 
changes with the reporting of internal control weaknesses, a positive relation is expected 
between first-time auditors and the reporting of a material weakness. INITIAL_AUDIT 
indicates whether the sample audit year is the auditor‘s initial audit of the county. 
INITIAL_AUDIT data are obtained by a FAC query of prior year county audits to 
determine if the same auditor performed the sample year audit. A dichotomous variable, 
INITIAL_AUDIT is coded as 1 if the sample year included a first-time auditor, and 0 
otherwise.  
Control Variables 
Prior research is mixed for audit quality and auditor types. Brown and 
Raghunandan (1995) and Jakubowski (1995) find that state and local government 
auditors perform higher quality audit work for federal grants than independent certified 
public accountants. The PCIE sample summarized in Brown and Raghunandan (1995) as 
well as the 2007 PCIE report show that government auditors provide quality work. 
Alternately, Lopez and Peters (2010) show that CPA firms perform higher quality audits 
than governmental auditors. Accordingly, no direction is predicted for this variable. 




government auditor, and 0 otherwise, i.e., the audit is performed by a CPA firm. Auditor 
names are listed in the FAC database and used to determine auditor type. 
An indicator variable describes whether the auditee has met the requirements 
outlined in OMB Circular A-133 for a low-risk auditee. The variable, HIGH_RISK, is 
coded as 0 if the county is designated as a low-risk auditee as determined from the FAC 
database, and 1 otherwise. This variable relates to an auditee‘s past performance and 
controls for clients with weak internal controls over compliance. Because low-risk 
auditees have not reported material weaknesses in the previous two audit years, a positive 
relation is expected between a high-risk auditee (HIGH_RISK) and the presence of a 
material weakness (MW_MP).  
Entity size, as proxied by the amount of the county‘s annual federal expenditures, 
is included as a control variable (Lopez and Peters 2010; Doyle et al. 2007; Copley and 
Doucet 1993a, 1993b). LN (TOTAL FED_EXPEND) is the natural log of total federal 
expenditures for each county. Prior research shows small companies are more likely to 
disclose a weakness in internal control as they have fewer resources to establish effective 
internal control systems (Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005; Bryan and Lilien 
2005). Higher total expenditures, however, also may be associated with more federal 
grants and a broader spectrum of grant programs. In addition, larger entities with higher 
grant awards may have more complex accounting systems. In these cases, the likelihood 
of material weaknesses might increase. Therefore, no direction is predicted between LN 
(TOTAL FED_EXPEND) and the presence of a material weakness over compliance. 
The number of audit clients in a certain industry demonstrates an auditor‘s 




Deis and Giroux 1992). The control variable LN (CLIENTS) indicates the natural log of 
the number of county audits performed each year by state auditor or local audit firm 
office as shown in the FAC database. A large client base of county audits indicates 
expertise in that sector and improves audit quality (Deis and Giroux 1992). Consequently, 
a positive relation is expected between LN (CLIENTS) and the dependent variable. 
While the number of county clients is significant in controlling for auditor characteristics, 
the types of clients is also an important factor. Because audit quality is unobservable, it is 
difficult to determine whether auditors are performing quality work in reporting material 
weaknesses or whether certain auditees are prone to having material weaknesses (Turner 
and Sennetti 2001). Absent from prior literature, a variable is needed to help control for 
the riskiness of county clients. Some auditors may have clients simply less prone to have 
material weaknesses. To control for auditors with a portfolio of county clients with a 
tendency toward material weaknesses, a composite score is developed. 
RISK_PORTFOLIO is the average score of high-risk county clients of each state auditor 
and local audit firm office for each fiscal year.  
MW_PY is an indicator variable coded as one for entities with material 
weaknesses over compliance reported in the prior year, and zero otherwise. A repeated 
material weakness may indicate that the client‘s internal controls are deficient and that 
the auditor has the ability to detect those weaknesses. MW_PY controls for counties with 
weak internal controls.  
YEAR is an indicator variable (1, 0) to identify the audit fiscal year (2006, 2007, 
or 2008) and to indicate temporal differences in fiscal years (Lopez and Peters 2010). The 






 Table 4.3 presents (untransformed) descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
explanatory variables in the model. The mean federal awards are $23,488,388 with a 
median of $3,814,115 thus providing significant variation in the size of federal award 
programs in the sample. Auditors range having from one to 86 county clients with a mean 
of 16.58 county clients and a median of four county clients each year. Higher numbers of 
county clients largely relate to state audit offices that audit the majority of counties in 
their respective states.
8
 Auditors‘ portfolio risk level for high-risk auditees is about 50 
percent as demonstrated by the mean and median of 0.49. This means that auditors in the 
sample have a relatively even mix of both high- and low-risk auditees. 
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MW_MP 0 .10 0 0.00 1 0.30 
PCAOB 0 .26  0 0.00 1 0.44 
GAQC 0 .60 0 1.00 1 0.49  
FS_MW 0 .29 0 0.00 1 0.45  
INITIAL_AUDIT 0 .07 0 0.00 1 0.26  
GOVT 0 .25 0 0.00 1 0.43  
HIGH_RISK 0 .47 0 0.00 1 0.50  
TOTAL FED. EXPEND.   
(millions) 
23 .43 0.50 3.81 3,458.36 106.30  
CLIENTS  16 .58 1 4.00 86 24.02  
RISK_PORTFOLIO 0 .49 0 0.49 1 0.39  
MW_PY 0 .09 0 0.00 1 0.29  
YEAR_2007 0 .34 0 0.00 1 0.47  




 Univariate statistics in Table 4.4 contain means for counties with material 
weaknesses in internal control compared to counties without material weaknesses as well 
as the differences between the means of the two groups. Chi-square and t-test statistics 
demonstrate significant differences between groups (p < 0.03) for all independent 



























 (t- statistic 
p-value 
bolded) 
PCAOB 0 .301  0 .252 5 .089 0 .024 
GAQC 0 .647 0 .593 4 .971 0 .026 
FS_MW 0 .699 0 .246 411 .832 <0 .0001 
INITIAL_AUDIT 0 .113 0 .068 12 .731 0 .0004 
GOVT 0 .203 0 .253 5 .541 0 .019 
HIGH_RISK 0 .817 0 .434 243 .525 <0 .0001 
TOTAL FED. EXPEND.  20,708,053 47,783,273 5 .192 <0 .0001 
CLIENTS  11 .871 17 .105 -5 .234 <0 .0001 
RISK_PORTFOLIO 0 .706 0 .462 13 .025 <0 .0001 
MW_PY 0 .503 0 .046 1038 .448 <0 .0001 
YEAR_2007 0 .360 0 .334 1 .218 0 .270 
YEAR_2008 0 .307 0 .324 0 .554 0 .457 
Observations  459 4 ,101   
 
Note: T-tests are performed for total federal expenditures, number of clients, and  





 Multicollinearity is considered by analyzing pairwise Spearman rank correlations 
for all variables that appear in the model (Table 4.5). Most of the bivariate correlations 
are low. The highest correlation is between HIGH_RISK and RISK_PORTFOLIO 
(0.772), two control variables, which indicates that high-risk auditees appear in risky 
auditor portfolios, as expected. To investigate the possible effects of this collinearity, 
sensitivity tests, as described in the next section, are performed. The correlation between 
GOVT and CLIENTS (0.718) is expected as some state auditors perform a majority of 





Table 4.5 - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models (n = 4,560) 
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) MW_MP 1.000               
               
(2) PCAOB  0.033 1.000            
  (0.024)             
(3) GAQC  0.033 0.435 1.000           
  (0.026) (0.000)            
(4) FS_MW  0.301 0.005 0.008 1.000          
  (0.000) (0.727) (0.597)           
(5) INITIAL_AUDIT  0.053 0.099 0.065 0.035 1.000         
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017)          
(6) GOVT -0.035 -0.337 -0.337 0.046 -0.129 1.000        
  (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)         
(7) HIGH_RISK 0.231 -0.101 -0.157 0.367 0.009 0.141 1.000       
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.552) (0.000)        
(8) TOT. EXPEND.  0.056 0.249 0.246 -0.103 0.038 -0.224 -0.066 1.000      
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)       
(9) CLIENTS  -0.019 -0.190 -0.077 0.038 -0.110 0.718 0.099 -0.113 1.000     
  (0.190) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
(10) RISK_PORT 0.193 -0.119 -0.183 0.325 0.005 0.174 0.772 -0.079 0.137 1.000    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.748) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
(11) MW_PY 0.477 0.041 0.400 0.228 0.055 -0.038 0.312 0.050 -0.010 0.214 1.000   
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) (0.515) (0.000)    
(12) YEAR_2007 0.016 0.000 -0.007 0.043 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.022 -0.015 -0.021 0.010 1.000  
  (0.270) (0.985) (0.637) (0.004) (0.905) (0.728) (0.740) (0.135) (0.303) (0.154) (0.488)   
(13) YEAR_2008 -0.011 0.029 0.049 0.068 -0.004 -0.017 0.060 .026 -0.005 0.078 0.033 -0.491 1.000 






 Table 4.6 presents results of the logistic regression model, with MW_MP as the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables, FS_MW, INITIAL_AUDIT, 
HIGH_RISK, LN (TOTAL FEDERAL EXPENDTIURES), MW_PY, YEAR_2007, and 
YEAR_2008 are significant at the 0.10 level or better in relation to the reporting of a 
material weakness over compliance (MW_MP). The pseudo R
2
 for the model (0.304) 
indicates a reasonable amount of variation left unexplained. Other auditor characteristics 
that may affect reporting of material weaknesses for single audits include education, 
experience (general audit and more specifically, single audit), continuing professional 
education in governmental auditing, professionalism, and work load (Deis and Giroux 
1992).  
 Given the strong results for both PCAOB and GAQC in the univariate tests, 
significance for both variables is expected in the logistic regression. The results, 
however, do not support H1 and H2 that PCAOB registration or membership in the 
AICPA‘s Government Audit Quality Center affects the reporting of a material weakness 
over compliance. Further investigation into the lack of significance for PCAOB 
registration is warranted. Approximately 25 percent (n = 1,172) of the auditors in the 
sample are registered with the PCAOB and reported material weaknesses for 138 
counties. The mean total federal expenditures for PCAOB-registered auditors are $51.4 
million, more than double the mean for the full sample. Even with using a reduced 
sample with total federal expenditures exceeding this amount, however, PCAOB 
registration is not significant. With the reduced sample of counties with total federal 
expenditures over $50 million, the pseudo R
2




 Sixty percent (n = 2,730) of auditors in the sample are voluntary members of the 
AICPA‘s Government Audit Quality Center, and they audit 65 percent (n = 297) of the 
counties with material weaknesses. Given the strong univariate results, the lack of 
significance for GAQC is investigated further. When counties with total expenditures 
under $10 million are excluded from the sample, GAQC becomes significant at 0.09 
levels. Reduced samples including counties with total federal expenditures exceeding $10 
million, $25 million, and $50 million all show significance for GAQC. The negative 
relation, however, is unexpected as auditors with GAQC membership appear less likely 
to report a material weakness. One explanation could be that GAQC members perform 
audits for counties without internal control deficiencies, and therefore are less likely to 
report them. While efforts are undertaken to control for client characteristics, the 
unexplained variation in the model indicates unidentified omitted variables. 
 Regression results show a highly significant (p < 0.0001) relation for counties 
reporting a material weakness in their financial statements. This result supports H3. In 
addition, a positive significant relation is found between initial-year auditors and 
reporting a material weakness. This supports the literature that first-year auditors report a 
higher likelihood of internal control deficiencies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Zhang et 




Table 4.6 - Logistic Regression Results  
 
MW_MP =  + PCAOB + GAQC + FS_MW + INITIAL_AUDIT  
   + GOVT + HIGH_RISK +LN (TOTAL FED_EXPEND)  




Variable Expected Sign  
Parameter 
Estimate P-value 
Intercept ? -7 .272 < 0.0001 
PCAOB (H1) + 0 .003  0.984 
GAQC (H2) + 0 .017  0.909 
FS_MW (H3) + 1 .728 < 0.0001 
INITIAL_AUDIT (H4) + 0 .352  0.067 
    
Control variables:    
GOVT +/- -0 .080  0.748 
HIGH_RISK + 0 .696  0.001 
LN(TOTAL FED. EXPEND.) +/- 0 .541 < 0.0001 
LN(CLIENTS) + -0 .030  0.843 
RISK_PORTFOLIO + -0 .188  0.450 
MW_PY + 2 .485 < 0.0001 
YEAR_2007 ? -0 .239  0.094 
YEAR_2008 ? -0 .539  0.003 
Observations   4 ,560 
Pseudo R
2
    .304 
LR Statistic   906 .321 




 The sample was partitioned at total federal expenditures of $23.4 million, the 
mean as presented in Table 4.7. Over 80 percent (n = 3,775) of counties have federal 
expenditures under $23.4 million. As with the full sample, H3 is supported for both large 
and small counties, but H4 is supported only for counties with federal expenditures 
exceeding $23.4 million. In addition, large counties have a significant (p = 0.038) but 
negative relation to auditor membership in the AICPA Government Audit Quality Center. 
It should be noted that total federal expenditures are not significant for small counties but 




for large counties. Pseudo R
2
 increases from 0.301 for small counties to 0.361 for large 
counties.  
 
Table 4.7 - Logistic Regression Results:   
       Partitioning of Counties by Total Federal Expenditure Mean Amounts 
 
MW_MP =  + PCAOB + GAQC + FS_MW + INITIAL_AUDIT  
   + GOVT + HIGH_RISK +LN (TOTAL FED_EXPEND)  
   +CLIENTS +RISK_PORTFOLIO + MW_PY 
























Intercept  -4 .657 <0 .0001 -11 .448 <0 .0001 
PCAOB (H1) + -0 .008 0 .964 0 .526 0 .113 
GAQC (H2) + 0 .210 0 .208 -0 .722 0 .038 
FS_MW (H3) + 1 .783 <0 .0001 1 .875 <0 .0001 
INITIAL_AUDIT (H4) + -0 .337 0 .196 1 .537 <0 .0001 
      
Control variables:      
GOVT +/- 0 .228 0 .435 0 .333 0 .589 
HIGH_RISK + 0 .575 0 .019 0 .836 0 .064 
LN(TOTAL FED. EXPEND.) +/- 0 .175 0 .275 0 .971 0 .003 
LN(CLIENTS) + -0 .313 0 .096 0 .628 0 .043 
RISK_PORTFOLIO + -0 .337 0 .242 0 .376 0 .486 
MW_PY + 2 .596 <0 .0001 2 .296 <0 .0001 
YEAR_2007  -0 .329 0 .044 -0 .023 0 .942 
YEAR_2008  -0 .713 <0 .0001 -0 .156 0 .621 
Observations   3, 775   785 
Pseudo R2    .301   .361 
LR Statistic   682 .759  245 .725 




The sample also was partitioned at median total federal expenditures of $3.8 
million with the results presented in Table 4.8. Empirical results are very similar to those 
for the sample division at the mean. For counties with federal expenditures below the 




expenditures exceeding the median. The R
2 
remains constant at 31 percent for both 
partitions. As in the case with the partition at the mean, total federal expenditures are 
only a significant factor with higher expenditures. The model is better fitted with making 
predictions for counties with higher federal expenditures. 
 
Table 4.8 - Logistic Regression Results: 
       Partitioning of Counties by Total Federal Expenditure Median Amounts 
 
MW_MP =  + PCAOB + GAQC + FS_MW + INITIAL_AUDIT  
   + GOVT + HIGH_RISK +LN (TOTAL FED_EXPEND)  
   +CLIENTS +RISK_PORTFOLIO + MW_PY 























Intercept  -3 .483 0 .120 -10 .697 <0 .0001 
PCAOB (H1) + 0 .120 0 .615 -0 .102 0 .610 
GAQC (H2) + 0 .210 0 .327 -0 .139 0 .516 
FS_MW (H3) + 1 .667 <0 .0001 1 .803 <0 .0001 
INITIAL_AUDIT (H4) + -0 .082 0 .806 0 .627 0 .009 
      
Control variables:      
GOVT +/- -0 .177 0 .644 0 .037 0 .916 
HIGH_RISK + 0 .627 0 .041 0 .705 0 .017 
LN(TOTAL FED. EXPEND.) +/- -0 .043 0 .906 0 .990 <0 .0001 
LN(CLIENTS) + 0 .086 0 .742 -0 .082 0 .684 
RISK_PORTFOLIO + -0 .383 0 .310 0 .021 0 .951 
MW_PY + 2 .703 <0 .0001 2 .292 <0 .0001 
YEAR_2007  -0 .307 0 .138 -0 .196 0 .041 
YEAR_2008  -0 .717 0 .002 -0 .412 0 .621 
Observations    2,070   2,070 
Pseudo R2    .311   .312 
LR Statistic   435 .846  490 .119 
Prob (LR statistic)   <0 .0001  <0 .0001 
 
 
The logistic regression model is used to test the sample by each audit year. In both 
2006 and 2007, only H3 is significant (p < 0.0001) where material weaknesses in internal 




2008, H3 is supported (p < 0.0001), and H4 is supported at a 0.08 level of significance. 
R
2
 ranges from 0.29 to 0.33 for the individual years.  
Prior research shows differences in audit quality based on auditor type (Brown 
and Raghunandan 1995; Jakubowski 1995; Lopez and Peters 2010). To investigate any 
differences between auditors, the sample is divided by auditor types:  
CPA firms (n = 3,431) and government auditors (n = 1,129). Regression results show that 
H3 is supported (p < 0.0001) with pseudo R
2
 of 0.350 for CPA firms. For government 
auditors, H2 (p = 0.014), H3 (p = 0.0001), and H4 (p = 0.033) are significant. Again, H2 
shows a negative relation between members of the AICPA Government Audit Quality 
Center and the reporting of a material weakness. With governmental auditors, however, 
R
2
 decreases to 0.224. 
The presence of a material weakness in the prior year is a significant control 
variable in all the empirical results. To investigate this variable, the sample was 
partitioned into counties with (n = 418) and without (n = 4,142) a MW_PY. In empirical 
results for both sub-samples, H3 and H4 are supported. The pseudo R
2
 for the reduced 
model for counties with a MW_PY is 0.111 with 0.132 for the reduced model for 
counties without a MW_PY. Chow‘s (1960) test of equality between the full and reduced 
models shows there is no significant difference between the models (F = < 0.0001). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Because logistic regression results may be influenced by outliers, the analysis is 
repeated after excluding extreme outliers (Copley and Doucet 1993a). Only minor 
changes are noted in the estimated coefficients with no changes in significant variables, 




probit regression, and the results are the same as those reported under the logistic 
regression model, with the exception of the year 2007 losing its marginal significance 
with the probit model. 
Variables are estimated with different specifications to test the robustness of the 
results. To evaluate results for county size, total federal expenditures are re-specified 
using both unlogged amounts and their square root. Using alternative measurements, the 
regression results are qualitatively unchanged. Due to the nonlinear behavior for the 
number of county clients, the regression model uses the natural log of CLIENTS 
(Lowensohn 2007; O‘Keefe et al. 1994). Next, the number of CLIENTS is squared, and 
the significance level for INITIAL_AUDIT increases to 0.12. Alternately, CLIENTS was 
re-specified by including an indicator variable equaling 1 if the auditor has five or more 
county clients, a statistic exceeding the median, and 0 otherwise. Regression results 
showed no differences in significant variables or change in R
2
. 
Sensitivity tests are performed for variables with high Spearman rank correlations 
as shown in Table 5. The highest correlation is between HIGH_RISK and 
RISK_PORTFOLIO (0.772), two control variables. To investigate the possible effects of 
this collinearity, two reduced models to omit each of the variables are estimated as 
sensitivity tests. No significant difference in regression results are noted when 
RISK_PORTFOLIO was omitted. When HIGH_RISK was omitted, no hypothesized 
results changed, but RISK_PORTFOLIO became positively significant. R-square 
estimations are virtually unchanged between the models. CLIENTS and GOVT have a 
0.718 correlation. Counties in some states are largely audited by state auditors; therefore, 




regression models to omit each of the variables are estimated. No changes in significant 
variables or R
2 
statistics are noted in the reduced models. 
The presence of state-related effects is evaluated. As noted in Table 4.2, the 
highest percentage of observations comes from Tennessee, a state where a majority of 
county audits are performed by state auditors. Other states have practices that influence 
the auditor types for county audits. For example, Washington state auditors perform all 
county audits. In contrast, county audits in Texas are performed exclusively by CPA 
firms. In Virginia, a single audit firm performs the majority of county audits. In order to 
determine whether these states influenced regression results, dummy variables are 
created. Inclusion of the indicator variables does not change the regression results. To 
isolate possible state-related effects, indicator variables are included for all states.
9
 With 
the extended model, H4 loses significance for auditor changes with no changes for 
control variables. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Auditor characteristics are important in regard to single audit outcomes. Prior 
research shows that CPA firms and government auditors provide differing levels of 
quality (Lopez and Peters 2010; Brown and Raghunandan 1995; Jakubowski 1995) and 
that there is a variance with CPA firm size (Deis and Giroux 1992; Lopez and Peters 
2010). Little research, however, has focused on other auditor characteristics. A sample of 
U.S. counties (general purpose) in fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 is used to investigate 
whether a reported material weakness in internal control over compliance for federal 
grants is associated with (1) audit firm registration with the PCAOB; (2) auditor 
                                                          
9
 The inclusion of nine states (AK, DE, ID, ME, NH, NJ, SD, UT, and WV) that perfectly predict binary 




membership in the AICPA‘s Government Audit Quality Center; (3) a material weakness 
in the financial statements; and (4) an initial-year auditor. 
This study finds that auditors that report material weaknesses in the financial 
statements are more likely to report material weaknesses in internal control over 
compliance. In addition, first-time auditors are more likely to report material weaknesses 
for single audits. This result is consistent that internal control weaknesses related to SOX 
Section 404 are more common with changes in auditors (Zhang et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007). A negative relation for the AICPA Government Audit Quality Center 
voluntary membership and the reporting of material weaknesses is found for counties 
with total federal expenditures exceeding $10 million. Finally, the statistical tests indicate 
no relation between PCAOB membership and material weaknesses. 
This study contributes to the literature by extending prior governmental audit 
research related to internal control weaknesses (Lopez and Peters 2010; Brown and 
Raghunandan 1995; Jakubowski 1995) and extends those studies by investigating specific 
auditor characteristics associated with material weakness disclosures. Empirical results 
also add to internal control literature (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007) for 
internal control weakness disclosures applied to a local government setting.  
Unlike SOX Section 404‘s criminal penalties for non-disclosure of material 
weaknesses in internal controls, federal guidelines do not outline penalties for non-
disclosure of material weaknesses in compliance. Consequently, a limitation of this study 
is that there may be instances where material weaknesses in internal controls over 




 Interpretation of the results of this study needs to be tempered by the recognition 
that the evidence pertains to one type of governmental unit (counties). Therefore, the 
generalizability of the results to other governmental types may be limited. Future 
research could study auditor characteristics for municipalities, colleges and universities, 
housing authorities, or not-for-profit organizations that receive federal funds or an 
extended sample period. The Single Audit Sampling Project revealed audit deficiencies 
for single audits. After hearing the results from that study, a congressional committee 
recommended continued efforts to monitor single audit quality. As new data becomes 
available, future research may focus on reviewing the changes in audit quality between 








Limited prior research examines material weaknesses in internal control over 
compliance in accordance with OMB Circular A-133. This three-paper dissertation 
evaluates the frequency and types of weaknesses reported, entity determinants for 
material weaknesses, and auditor characteristics associated with described weaknesses. 
This study adds to the existing body of literature by exploring new hypotheses and 
focusing on a single entity type: U.S. counties. In addition, the samples incorporate recent 
single audit legislation, and no other study investigates determinants of material 
weaknesses for federal grants. Results will interest county management, grantor agencies, 
and auditors as they work to strengthen and monitor internal controls. 
The first study maps material weaknesses in internal control over compliance into 
the five components of internal control as outlined by COSO. Weaknesses are not 
proportionate across the five categories, with the largest proportion of weaknesses 
classified as control activities. This result supports prior literature that uses the COSO 
framework to map internal control weaknesses. The fewest number of weaknesses are 
categorized as risk assessment. Both risk assessment and control activity weaknesses are 
associated with the size of county federal grant expenditures. 
This study contributes to the literature mapping internal control weaknesses in 
several ways. First, this is the first study to focus solely on material weaknesses reported 
under single audits. The study also incorporates current single audit provisions that were 
revised in 1997. Next, the sample is national and uses a single entity type thereby 




The concentration of material weaknesses classified as control activities 
highlights the importance for county managers to evaluate existing policies and 
procedures to ensure they are designed to prevent and detect weaknesses in this area. One 
implication is that more weaknesses occur in this category but another could be that 
auditors focus more audit procedures in this area than others. Future research could 
determine whether significant deficiencies follow the same mapping pattern as material 
weaknesses or whether different entity types receiving federal funds produce similar 
results. 
The second study is exploratory in examining determinants for material 
weaknesses in internal control over compliance. Consistent with SEC companies that 
report material weaknesses over financial reporting under SOX Section 404, counties 
with described material weaknesses are complex and financially weak. In addition, they 
are more likely to have material weaknesses regarding their financial statements. Unlike 
the studies using SEC companies, county size is not a significant factor. 
No other research studies entity factors related to federal grant weaknesses, and 
this study offers a starting point for future work. Generalizability of the results to longer 
time frames or to other entity types, however, may be limited. The ability to increase 
sample size by adding years or to explore whether these results are consistent across other 
entity types such as municipalities, colleges and universities, and not-for-profit 
organizations receiving federal funds could help further extend the literature. In addition, 
since a large percentage of counties with material weaknesses related to federal grants 
also have weaknesses related to financial statements, research can be extended to study 




closely parallel the determinants for either SEC companies under SOX Section 404, or 
material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. 
The third paper investigates auditor characteristics associated with the disclosure 
of a material weakness in internal control over compliance in accordance with OMB 
Circular A-133 for U.S. counties over a three-year period. Empirical results indicate that 
auditors who report material weaknesses in county financial statements are more likely to 
report material weaknesses in internal control over compliance. Material weaknesses 
identified in single audits are also more likely to be reported by first-year auditors. This 
finding is consistent with prior literature that finds internal control weaknesses related to 
SOX Section 404 are more common with changes in auditors. This study extends the 
body of governmental research by addressing specific auditor characteristics related to 
material weaknesses. 
Released in 2007, the Single Audit Sampling Project highlighted single audit 
concerns and resulted in congressional hearings regarding single audits along with plans 
for a follow-up study. With the release of follow-up study, new research opportunities 
can compare results between the two studies and investigate reasons for the changes. 
With the recent release of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 117, ―Compliance 
Audits,‖ audits of federal grants remain in the spotlight. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government has authorized unprecedented amounts in federal awards in recent years, 
which underlies the need to ensure grant administrators follow federal policies and 
procedures. This dissertation provides additional information on material weaknesses and 
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